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THESIS ABSTRACT 
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Master of Arts 
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September 2013 
 
Title: American and Norwegian Press’ Approaches to Identification of Criminal Suspects 
or Arrestees: The Public’s Right to Know Versus the Private Citizen’s Right to 
Privacy, Reputation, and Presumption of Innocence 
 
This thesis examines the processes the American and Norwegian press go 
through when identifying (or not) private citizens who are suspected of or arrested for a 
crime. Four central principles are explored in detail and elaborated upon as they relate to 
the press and individuals in the criminal justice system: the public’s right to know, the 
right to privacy, protection of reputation, and presumption of innocence. Three 
Norwegian newspaper editors and an independent consultant to the Norwegian Institute 
of Journalism elaborated on how identification of criminal suspects is determined in 
Norway. The Norwegian case study provides an alternative approach to identification. 
Both legal and ethics solutions are proposed as a way to help protect the privacy, 
reputation, and presumption of innocence of private individuals suspected of or arrested 
for a crime but without unconstitutionally intruding on press freedom. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In a comparative analysis of press practices in the United States and Norway, this 
thesis focuses on how private individuals suspected of or arrested for a crime are 
identified in newspapers.1 At what point in the criminal justice process is it ethically or 
legally feasible and fair to identify these individuals in a newspaper’s story? Both 
countries have constitutional free press guarantees and democratically elected 
governments. But Norway is selected for this thesis because of its press’ resoundingly 
divergent rationales to that of its U.S. counterparts for why they may or may not identify 
individuals caught up in the criminal justice system — from being a suspect to conviction 
or exoneration. Norway, too, consistently maintains a vibrant, consistently top-ranking 
and flourishing media system.2 So, what does the country’s press system do so 
differently? Is there anything the U.S. press can learn from this small country’s methods? 
 When judicial proceedings begin, all parties to these proceedings have an 
opportunity to present their story, which the press conveys to its readers. Prior to 
proceedings in the United States, however, largely one version of a story related to 
criminal matters — that of the police and prosecutor — is relayed in the press, and that 
version includes identifying information. It is at this point, prior to judicial proceedings, 
                                                 
1 For research purposes, identification includes names and/or photos. Additionally, “suspects” include 
people authorities consider “of interest” in criminal wrong-doing and “arrestees” who have been detained, 
though not necessarily charged with a crime. The definition also extends to individuals at preliminary 
hearings; those who at arraignment — except those facing murder charges — are released on their own 
recognizance, released on bail, or continue to be detained; and individuals throughout pre-trial motions. 
 
2 Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index,” accessed July 23, 2013, 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1054; Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press,” 
accessed July 23, 2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/norway. 
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where the threat of undue harm occurs. The thesis seeks to identify ways of minimizing 
identification of suspects and arrestees while at the same time respecting the rights of 
news media to inform their readers of criminal matters in judicial proceedings.3  
 In the United States, the press largely cannot be punished for publishing 
identifying information, especially when it has been obtained through public records or 
when it relates to matters in judicial proceedings in the court system. This information 
includes suspects (such as persons of interest not charged of any crime) as well as 
arrestees. However, there are lawful exemptions to what identifying information is 
publicly disclosed, including: sexual assault complainants, juvenile offenders, accusees in 
quasi-criminal proceedings, grand jury proceedings, and arrest records.4 These specific 
exemptions allow the government to withhold this information. Press ethics, too, may 
suggest withholding information from publication in certain instances even if no law bars 
it (e.g., information about suspects who have not been formally charged with a crime). 
 Within Norwegian criminal court proceedings, should a news outlet reveal the 
identity of parties and/or persons prior to the initiation of court proceedings, it may be 
held liable to two forms of actions — defamation and protection of personality — both of 
which are written into statutory law as well as supported by case law. While this allows 
some leeway in the law granted to news outlets with regard to publication of 
identification, the Norwegian Press Council, which news outlets are members of and 
financially support, nonetheless urges its members via the Norwegian Press Code of 
                                                 
3 What this thesis will not cover is any form of information suppression — including identification — of 
parties involved between the government and the accused prior to judicial proceedings. 
 
4 Sadiq Reza, “Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search of a Right, in Need of a Rule,” 
Maryland Law Review 64, no. 3 (2005): 780-795. 
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Ethics to be rather cautious in revealing the identity of individuals in the criminal justice 
system. 
 By and large, the point at which the each country’s press publishes identifying 
information without fear of legal proceedings or violating of codes of ethics is what 
separates American identification of private individuals in crime stories from their 
Norwegian counterparts. 
 This thesis examines, too, several principles from multiple perspectives (e.g., 
ethical, legal, historical) each country’s press take into account in their reporting: the 
public’s right to know, privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence. By 
highlighting these principles within this body of scholarship, it is hoped some level of 
trade-off is found to balance privacy rights with a public criminal process open to media 
disclosure. 
 Chapters II and III focuses on the American press’ approach to identification of 
criminal suspects or arrestees. Chapter II starts by detailing what is considered crime 
news. In order to understand the criminal justice system and how it plays a role in the 
press’ decision to identify individuals considered suspects or arrestees, the chapter shows 
how the criminal charging decision works as well as examining press relationship with 
the police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Chapter III looks at the rationale behind 
identifying criminal suspects or arrestees — from the point of view of the press and the 
police and prosecutors. 
 Chapters IV through VII steps away from the American approach to identification 
and delves into the various principles involved in identification process, which both 
country’s press encounter. From the press’ side of the issue, Chapter IV highlights the 
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public’s right to know. Chapter V looks at the right of privacy, how it benefits 
individuals, and how this right is used to justify protecting assorted individuals in the 
criminal justice system. Chapter VI examines the role of reputation in the lives of private 
citizens and the reputational harm that comes from being tied to the criminal justice 
system. Lastly, Chapter VII seeks to explain the principle of presumption of innocence 
and what it means outside of the law in the realm of ethical consideration. 
 Having examined these four principles in the previous chapters, Chapter VIII 
shifts to Norway and looks at what factors are at play when it comes to identifying (or not 
identifying, as the case may be for this country) criminal suspects or arrestees in news 
stories. These influential factors include the law as well as press codes of ethics, a press 
council, and the press council’s complaints commission. To gain a better understanding 
of the Norwegian press’ thought process when it comes to identification of individuals in 
the criminal justice system, this thesis explores the views of three editors and an 
independent consultant to the Norwegian Institute of Journalism. Lastly, the chapter gives 
a larger picture of how Norway operates in relation to other Scandinavian countries by 
going over these country’s press codes of ethics, press councils, and how complaints 
against their respective press are addressed. 
 The thesis concludes in Chapter IX by offering a legislative solution as well as 
ethical solutions the American press itself could use to strike a better balance between 
privacy rights and media disclosure of persons facing charges of criminal wrong-doing.  
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CHAPTER II 
CRIME NEWS AND THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
What is crime news? 
Unpleasant events take place in the life of society, just as pleasant ones do, and 
“no good reasons exist why society should be shielded from knowledge of what is ugly 
and be informed only of what is beautiful. Crimes take place, laws are broken, violence is 
committed, often horribly.”5 Crime of almost any sort is a threat to citizens of a society; 
they have a need to know about it, its detection, its prevention, and any punishments 
meted out.6  
 Throughout today’s society, “high-tech, fast paced modern culture overstimulates 
emotional responses to overwrought, negative, and shallow crime news coverage.”7 In the 
news, “Particular attention is paid to homicide and sexual offences, true to the journalistic 
adage: ‘if it bleeds it leads.’”8 Crime news also favors the emotionally gripping narrative 
over the dispassionate, abstract argument.9 Or, as Taslitz summarizes the point: “Stories 
grab eyeballs; abstractions shutter eyelids.”10 Coverage of crime has now become such an 
entrenched part of the American culture that it is considered a major form of public 
                                                 
5 Alfred Friendly and Ronald L. Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity: The Impact of News on the Administration 
of Justice (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967), 40. 
 
6 Ibid., 42. 
 
7 Andrew E. Taslitz, “The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need 
More Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press,” Hastings Law Journal 62, no. 5 (2011): 1288. 
 
8 Michael Bohlander, “Open Justice or Open Season?: Should the Media Report the Names of Suspects and 
Defendants?” The Journal of Criminal Law 74, no. 4 (2010): 322. 
 
9 Jack Fuller, What is Happening to News: The Information Explosion and the Crisis of Journalism 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 120-126. 
 
10 Taslitz, “The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the Unfair Trial,” 1290. 
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entertainment.11 According to Friendly and Goldfarb, “American press coverage of crime 
news often is excessive and offensive, pandering to the lowest taste and unnecessary even 
for the most basic commercial reasons.”12 News of crime and punishment, thievery and 
violence, murder and sex — these, according to the authors, “are what excite interest and 
rivet attention.”13 
 News of crime, though, “however much it may be deplored -- however much it is 
really deplorable — … contain[s] the essentials of theater, often great theater.”14 “Any 
good crime story,” according to Moscou, “is, after all, a dramatic human story.”15 In 
periods of high tension over issues under furious debate, the criminal charge, the ensuing 
developments, and finally the trial seem fated to come to pass as the climax.16 Any 
human tragedies spun from this media coverage are “simply the cost of doing business in 
a free society with a free press. … sometimes a private person finds him- or herself in the 
media's crosshairs.”17 Essentially, “Interest in news of crime and punishment is much too 
powerful an impulse to be beaten down.”18 As Lippmann once noted, “The trouble with 
crime and punishment as it concerns the press is that it is too interesting and too 
                                                 
11 Denise M. Chanez, “Twohig v. Blackmer: New Mexico’s Broad Protection for Trial Participant Speech 
and the Hurdles to Cross Before Imposing Gag Orders,” New Mexico Law Review 35, no. 3 (2005): 587-88. 
 
12 Friendly and Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity, 34. 
 
13 Ibid., 37. 
 
14 Ibid., 3. 
 
15 Jim Moscou, “Naming Names: The Legal Choices,” Editor & Publisher 133, no. 51 (2000): 43. 
 
16 Ibid. 
 
17 Moscou, “Naming Names,” 45. 
 
18 Friendly and Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity, 5. 
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absorbing and too convincing because it comes out of real life.”19  But whether in dark 
ways or bright, news of crime and punishment comes closer to being “the stuff of ‘real 
life’” to the average citizen than news of almost any other field of human actions.20  
Friendly and Goldfarb ask: “Why publish all that news about crime anyway? It 
serves no social purpose; indeed, it is, if anything, injurious to the morals and behavior of 
the citizenry. Its publication merely breeds more crime and perversion. You publish it 
because it means more circulation, more money to you...and for no other reason.”21 Yet, 
they note, readership surveys indicate the best-read items in a newspaper are those about 
crime.22 “This fact,” they write, “is no doubt a sorry reflection on the level of American 
taste and a cause for melancholy tongue-clucking by everyone dedicated to a moral uplift. 
But it is a fact. Every editor knows it. ”23 They conclude that, with or without readership 
surveys, the editor knows crime news is “the hottest article on his counter,”24 and that 
within limits, “publication of crime news bolsters readership and circulation.”25 Crime 
news is a daily staple: Easy to gather and guaranteed to sell news content, crime has thus 
                                                 
19 Lippmann, Walter, speech to the International Press Institute, May 27, 1965, quoted by Alfred Friendly, 
vice president and managing editor of The Washington Post, speaking for Free Press and Fair Trial, Part 
1, Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Session, August 17-20, 1965. 
 
20 Friendly and Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity, 41. 
 
21 Ibid., 34. 
 
22 Ibid., 35. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Ibid., 35-36. 
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become an essential part of the news rotation.26 Crime, in other words, sells 
newspapers.27 
In today's society, Bohlander wonders if the media are in it for “the sake of 
enhancing justice or the sake of enhancing sales … or whether the current practice is not 
actually that of merely pandering to the baser instincts of the members of society.”28 For 
Mueller, as long as peddling crime news and entertainment remains profitable, mass 
communications media will continue to emphasize crime since the “sensationalistic, 
profit-minded, mass communication medium knows how to exploit the bestseller crime 
for its own business purposes.”29 The public, according to Wright, “has demonstrated a 
voracious appetite for the trivia frequently served to them by the media.”30 But market 
conditions do not justify media substituting their own ethical judgments with those of the 
police and district attorney's office: “The ethics of journalism and the ethics of legal 
practice are two different animals serving two different policy goals.”31  
                                                 
26 S. Chermak, “Crime in the News Media: A Refined Understanding of How Crimes Become News,” in 
Media, Process and the Social Construction of Crime: Studies in Newsmaking Criminology, ed. G. Barak 
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995), 97. 
 
27 Andrew E. Taslitz, “The Duke Lacrosse Players and the Media: Why the Fair Trial-Free Press Paradigm 
Doesn’t Cut It Anymore,” in Race to Injustice: Lessons Learned from the Duke Lacrosse Rape Case, ed. 
Michael L. Seigel (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press: 2009), 184. 
 
28 Bohlander, “Open Justice or Open Season?” 323. 
 
29 Gerhard O. W. Mueller, “Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings,” University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 110, no. 1 (1961): 15, 18. 
 
30 J. Skelly Wright, “Defamation, Privacy, and the Public’s Right to Know: A National Problem and a New 
Approach,” Texas Law Review 46, no. 5 (1968): 632. 
 
31 Richard J. Peltz, “Fifteen Minutes of Infamy: Privileged Reporting and the Problem of Perpetual 
Reputational Harm,” Ohio Northern University Law Review 34, no. 3 (2008): 743. 
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There is a long-held American value in an open judicial system, so that the public 
can understand and gauge what happens when someone is accused of wrong doing; there 
are also other reasons for reporting news on crime.  
 One justification for making available crime news is that it provides the public 
with information. This kind of news informs the public regarding scandal and corruption 
in addition to providing information that allows citizens the opportunity to protect 
themselves against crime. Generally, petty crimes are typically not newsworthy but can 
be if a reporter notices some peculiar repetition or pattern; these stories are news because 
the media are attempting to inform the public about the potential danger. It is this 
instance of providing information to the public that poses particular difficulties within 
news organizations, as they try to balance the need to keep the public informed about 
certain dangers while not infringing upon an individual’s right to privacy.32 
 Another justification for presenting crime in the news is for its deterrent effect. 
This assumes potential criminals pay attention to the news, the presentation of crime, or 
other criminals getting caught. Describing how criminals are sentenced to years in prison 
might deter others from committing crime. One object of the criminal justice system is to 
deter law violators from committing certain types of crime, and one way of 
accomplishing that is to use the news media to assist them with this objective. For 
example, police departments publicize weekend sobriety checkpoints and holiday speed 
traps to deter individuals from driving drunk or speeding. News follow-ups on the 
                                                 
 32 Chermak, “Crime in the News Media,” 104; Grant M. Hyde, Handbook for Newspaper Workers, 
Treating Grammar, Punctuation, English, Diction, Journalistic Structure, Typographical Style, Accuracy, 
Headlines, Proofreading, Copy Reading, Type, Cuts, Libel, Applied Ethics and Other Matters of Office 
Practice (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1926), 208. 
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productiveness of these police tools are presented in the hope of deterring future law 
violators.33 
 Crime delivered as entertainment “capitalizes on the public’s fascination with 
gore and pathos,” according to Chermack.34 Crime stories provide real-life drama and 
entertainment that can stir the emotions, making such stories more appealing to the 
public35 — and move the public to take action, right a wrong, or address a pressing public 
issue. 
 The prevalence of crime stories in the news can partially be explained by the 
nature of the criminal justice system. The discovery and reporting of a crime to 
authorities is only the initiation of the criminal justice process. Thereafter, the players to a 
crime typically go through a number of stages in order to be fully processed by the 
system, which may take months or years. Because of this, crime stories are ongoing, 
which allows a crime to be covered at each stage of the process, allowing for news 
organizations to have a steady supply of newsworthy crime stories throughout the 
process.36  
 Crime publicity has characteristically been used as an aid to the police.37 
According to Mueller, misleading information can be released in an effort to trap a 
suspect, to have the description of a suspect published, which may lead to an arrest, or 
create a favorable press/police atmosphere in which the police can operate successfully in 
                                                 
33 Mueller, “Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings,” 15-17; Chermak, “Crime in 
the News Media,” 105; Hyde, Handbook for Newspaper Workers, 208. 
 
34 Chermak, “Crime in the News Media,” 106. 
 
35 Ibid.; Friendly and Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity, 3, 37; Moscou, “Naming Names,” 43. 
 
36 Chermak, “Crime in the News Media,” 106-107. 
 
37 Hyde, Handbook for Newspaper Workers, 208. 
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their duties. In short, he suggests, the news media “do have the power to foster law 
enforcement and thus to contribute to the general weal, and they do occasionally use this 
power properly, but so far it has served only a minor function.”38 
 Lastly, crime is used to fill the gap in the newsmaking process, where a large 
news hole exists for these stories that must be filled because of their readership 
popularity. A news organization has established access to players in the criminal justice 
system as well as to a pool of potential newsworthy crimes available for story selection to 
fill the gap. In the realm of crime stories, criminal justice sources are critical to news 
production.39  
 
How the criminal charging decision works 
 Part of the responsibility of the police is to investigate many suspects who are 
never charged with a crime, regardless of how unpromising the investigation turns out.40 
Seldom, however, are the names of suspects publicized in news stories.41 (N.B.: The 
government has increasingly been using “person of interest” in place of “suspect” or 
“target” — the latter two of which have legal definitions requiring police and prosecutors 
to follow specific steps to ensure constitutional rights are honored.42 The use of “person 
of interest” is “the new appellation for someone the government wishes to name as a 
                                                 
38 Mueller, “Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings,” 17. 
 
39 Chermak, “Crime in the News Media,” 109. 
 
40 Brendan W. Williams, “Defamation as a Remedy for Criminal Suspects Tried Only in the Media,” 
Communications and the Law 19, no. 3 (1997): 63. 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 Toni Locy, Covering America's Courts: A Clash of Rights (New York: Peter Lang, 2013), 13. 
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criminal suspect with impunity, but these interested persons find their lives damaged as if 
they had been labeled suspects.”43)  
 The police possess enormous power to make arrests,44 which “signifies a 
temporary removal of an individual from society for the purpose of determining whether 
she is guilty or innocent of the crime with which she has been charged.”45 In the criminal 
justice system, an arrest means that, at a particular point in time, a police officer thought, 
rightly or wrongly, there was probable cause to believe that a particular person committed 
a particular offense.46 Probable cause, which the police need in order to arrest someone, 
is the lowest standard of proof in the law.47 It means the officer had a reasonable belief — 
a slightly better than a 50-50 chance48 — that a crime was committed and a particular 
person did it.49 When an arrest is made without a warrant, the law requires a judicial 
finding of probable cause for the arrest soon after.50 
As might be expected, the criminal justice system starts with police officers, “of 
whom we ask and expect a great deal, all in the name of protecting and making us feel  
                                                 
43 Reza, “Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect,” 772 (see Chap. I, n. 3). 
 
44 Ibid. 
 
45 Shima Baradaran, “Restoring the Presumption of Innocence,” Ohio State Law Journal 72, no. 4 (2011): 
768. 
 
46 James B. Jacobs, “The Jurisprudence of Police Intelligence Files and Arrest Records,” National Law 
School of India Review 22, no. 1 (2010): 142-143. 
 
47 Locy, Covering America's Courts, 31. 
 
48 Ibid., 39. 
 
49 Ibid., 31. 
 
50 Jacobs, “The Jurisprudence of Police Intelligence Files,” 143. 
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safe.”51 But, they can — and do — make mistakes.52 Most police officers are honest, but 
they are human and may have personal biases and baggage. They can “develop tunnel 
vision, ignoring clues and evidence, which would lead them to focus on the wrong 
suspect.”53 They may also gather evidence from witnesses who, “in the rush of adrenalin, 
often mistakenly identify suspects and misstate what they heard or saw.”54 
The top prosecutors, who are elected and, thus, politically motivated, seek to 
persuade the public to see themselves as “tough on crime and in control.”55 They have at 
their disposal a number of assistants and investigators who review evidence gathered by 
police officers and decide which cases to pursue and which to drop. In other words, 
according to Locy, “they decide whom to charge with a crime — or not.”56  
As the running joke goes, “a prosecutor can indict a ham sandwich.”57 An 
indictment “is only the government’s claim that a crime was committed by the defendant; 
it is not evidence that a crime was committed or that the defendant committed it.”58 What 
this means is prosecutors have practically unfettered discretion in deciding what charges 
to bring against someone,59 in that they “have the most to say about whether to file 
                                                 
51 Locy, Covering America's Courts, 17. 
 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 Ibid. 
 
54 Ibid. 
 
55 Ibid., 13. 
 
56 Ibid., 19. 
 
57 Peltz, “Fifteen Minutes of Infamy,” 740. 
 
58 Richard D. Friedman, “A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds,” Stanford Law Review 52, no. 4 
(2000): 880, note 20. 
 
59 Jacobs, “The Jurisprudence of Police Intelligence Files,” 146. 
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charges against a suspect and which charges to select. Granted they react to an initial 
charged proposed by the police, …(b)ut in the end, the prosecutor can overrule police 
charging decisions without interference.”60 
Prosecutors generally ask two main questions. First, did the police have probable 
cause to make the arrest? Second, will the evidence obtained convince a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the individual in question committed the crime?61 Beyond 
reasonable doubt “is the highest standard in the law, meaning as close to 100-percent 
certainty is possible.”62 This is the standard prosecutors care most about, as their re-
election may be dependent upon their success in convictions, especially in high-profile 
cases.63 
 It is legal, too, for them to bring a number of different charges stemming from one 
criminal act — as long as each offense committed requires proof of at least one fact that 
the others don’t.64 As such, prosecutors “have enormous discretion — or put another way, 
raw power — to dictate the ending of a case by manipulating the beginning in the 
choosing the charges to include in an indictment.” This power “dwarfs that of the defense 
in most cases.”65 Recognition of this power is what prompted Robert H. Jackson, who 
later became a U.S. Supreme Court justice and prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials, to 
opine “The citizen’s safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, 
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who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who 
approaches his task with humility.”66 Of course, prosecutors are not judges; rather, they 
are advocates of a special kind. Only the prosecutor — among all lawyers — has an 
overriding duty to “do justice,” which, while ambiguous, requires ensuring procedural 
fairness to all parties.67 
 Overall, though, the decision to charge is rather complex. Prosecutors must 
decide, first off, whether to charge someone with a crime at all and whether to drop cases 
not worth pursuing due to limited resources.68 If a prosecutor decides to proceed with a 
case, it must be determined whether there is sufficient evidence to support a particular 
charge or a number of charges.69 If prosecutors have incomplete information at this stage 
of prosecution, they may, in an abundance of caution, charge as many offenses as their 
conscience will bear, a phenomenon dubbed by its critics “overcharging.”70 They may 
also use the function of charging to lay the groundwork for “wired pleas,” which are 
pleas arising when prosecutors charge third-party members (e.g., family) in order to put 
pressure on an arrestee to cooperate.71 
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 Or, they might reach a “pretrial probation” — or “diversion” — program 
agreement with a presumed offender.72 These agreements postpone charging to allow an 
individual the opportunity to prove he or she can stay out of trouble, in addition to 
addressing recidivism risk factors by, for example, getting drug treatment or a high 
school diploma.73 If this probation is successfully completed, the case and charges against 
her are dropped, as if it had never been.74  
 Of course, a prosecutor may choose not to pursue a potential prosecution or may 
drop charges for arrestees-turned-informants, so that these individuals cooperate with 
police in pursuing other presumed offenders; such individuals may even reveal 
information — or testify about — crimes in the past.75 Other options in lieu of proceeding 
with charges include the arrestee working undercover, wearing wires, doing drug deals, 
or “otherwise participating in new criminal activity in an effort to ensnare other 
lawbreakers.”76  
 There are also many reasons why arrests themselves do not result in convictions. 
For example, a case may still be pending; there may eventually be a conviction. 
Sometimes these cases can take many months to reach a final judgment. Also, the 
processing of a case may be interrupted and perhaps delayed because the arrestee is not 
available — that is, he or she could be sick, fled the jurisdiction, etc. True, too, is that this 
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individual may have requested a postponement of trial to accommodate his lawyer’s 
schedule or even to obtain more forensic testing.77 
 A prevalent reason an arrest does not ripen into a conviction is the lack of victim 
and/or witness cooperation, a reason having nothing to do with the arrestee’s actual 
innocence. Additionally, the victim or witness could have died, may have become too ill 
to testify, or moved away.78 In other words, a case can be rejected because the witnesses 
turn out to be not dependable.79 Some victims and witnesses may not want to take time 
off from work, or they themselves have a criminal record and fear scrutiny by the police 
and prosecutor. For example, a victim may be involved in a relationship with the arrestee 
and 1.) fear that cooperating with the prosecutor would jeopardize the arrestee’s financial 
and/or emotional support, or 2.) fear the cooperation would lead the arrestee to retaliate 
against them (i.e., the victim).80 
  Also, an arrest may not result in a conviction due to evidentiary or other legal 
problems. For example, crucial evidence may not be admissible during trial because of an 
unconstitutional search and seizure, identification procedure (i.e., a line-up), or 
interrogation. A court may dismiss charges because the time limit for moving the case 
along (e.g., statutory speedy trial rules) has expired. A judge may dismiss charges 
because of prosecutorial misconduct before trial.81 Furthermore, sometimes prosecutors 
decline to pursue a case because the crime is thought to be de minimis, or not serious 
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enough.82 Or if the witnesses to a case are all drug addicts, a prosecutor might worry that 
a jury may not believe them.83 
 
The press’ relationship with the police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys 
 As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the public has long been fascinated by 
crime stories and expects a measure of crime news coverage from media outlets; for their 
part, law enforcement officials and the prosecutor’s office depend on crime news 
coverage for the shaping of their image in the community as well as justification of crime 
suppressant funding.84  And the press’ construction of crime news itself is crucially 
dependent on them.85 
However, journalists and criminal justice system officials often engage in a 
precarious but symbiotic relationship; each side has a specific interest in news on crime, 
and each, to large degree, serves its own interest.86 With crime news reporting so heavily 
dependent on these criminal justice system sources — with longstanding media routines 
reinforcing the use of these sources in news on crime87 — the media may suffer greatly if 
the relationships with law enforcement officials is strained.88 Of course, the opposite is 
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true as well since the media have largely been a police department’s link to the general 
public.  
 This communication with the public through the news serves a number of 
purposes. First, crime is a topic of great public interest.89 Additionally, this mode of 
communication provides a number of opportunities for community policing, that is, 
citizens assisting the police in identifying crime problems in a community as well as 
assisting police in solving crimes.90 Also, as noted earlier, when police are portrayed as 
effective (e.g., succeeding in criminal investigations), such exposure in the news 
translates into increased funding for police efforts.91 Finally, the coverage of police 
success in criminal investigations conveys their effectiveness to the public.92 
The police officer, prosecutor, or attorney who leaks information will get a “quid 
pro quo” in the form of favorable publicity; those who refuse to leak information may get 
unfavorable or no publicity.93 The freedom to publicize what can be found out about 
investigations has one further consequence: Since some types of crime are highly 
newsworthy, publicity-seeking police officers will concentrate efforts on such crimes to 
the detriment of the investigation of other, less newsworthy — but equally more 
important — crimes.94 
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There is not any logical reason, Taslitz argues, to presuppose the media will say 
largely negative things about criminal suspects or arrestees.95 But, even if logic does not 
dictate this outcome, “it is nevertheless the empirical documented reality, with a variety 
of social forces pushing coverage in an antidefendant direction — especially 
immediately after the media takes note of the case.”96 In other words, the coverage is 
typically heavily biased against the arrestee.97 The police and prosecutors have far more 
access to case-specific information early in a case than the defense does, so the former’s 
version of events is what makes it into the news first.98 Other reasons include “the lurid 
nature of many high-profile crimes; the media-generated atmosphere about crime in 
general, which makes pro-prosecution tales more credible to audiences than prodefendant 
counter-stories”99; and the press being “dependent upon law enforcement for rapid access 
to information needed to make deadlines, especially early in the case.”100 Related to this 
last point, “the press pays a high cost in reduced access if it slants coverage in ways 
disliked by law enforcement, including prosecutors”101 — especially since the same 
reporters understand they have a continuing and symbiotic relationship with them and 
repeatedly deal in different cases with the same police officers and prosecutors.102  
 Yet, for the defense, a reporter may cross a particular defense attorney’s path but 
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once, “creating less incentive [for reporters] to curry favor with the defense.”103 Chermak 
showed how out of 6,300 criminal justice sources providing information in crime stories, 
over half were either a police (29.4%) or court (25.3%) source, with 6.9% from non-
specific sources, which were cited as “sources say,” “officials say,” or “authorities say”; 
the defense attorneys, by way of contrast, represented only 8.9% of these sources.104 The 
defense, over time, may be able to gain enough information to offer a counter-story.105 
But, on the whole, defense attorneys “seem at a decided rhetorical disadvantage 
compared to prosecutors.”106 They are overworked and underpaid; and with many of 
them “rightly suspecting” the vast majority of their clients are either guilty or likely to be 
guilty if they proceed to trial, defense attorneys lack comparable incentives (when 
compared to prosecutors; see previous paragraph) to mount elaborate defenses, like 
challenging charges made against their client.107 Furthermore, making their narrative 
more challenging to get out to the press is the fact that “prosecutors are not required to 
share every tidbit of evidence with defense attorneys and can hold back information until 
cases are well under way.”108 But precisely because the press reporting on crime depends 
on the state for information, “short-term, moderate coverage results in a very one-sided, 
antidefendant narrative.”109 More detailed, longer-lived publicity, however, is 
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“increasingly likely to embrace a two-sided narrative. Unfortunately, it can take a very 
long time for more-balanced coverage to kick in.”110 
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CHAPTER III  
NAMING OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS OR ARRESTEES 
 
Identification by the press 
 Reading a news story without learning the name of an alleged offender “feels 
incomplete and unsatisfying.”111 Such an experience is one of titillatio interruptus, 
creating a sensation not very dissimilar to the sensation upon not finding an end to, say, 
this sentence.112 In U.S. crime stories, “We are used to hearing the name.”113 But, is it 
necessary to know that information, especially about private individuals who are 
suspected of or arrested for a crime? 
 In many instances, according to Solove, the “facts of the story may be of 
legitimate concern to the public, but the identification of the people involved might not 
further the story’s purpose.”114 Of course, concealing identities cannot work for all stories 
— most especially those about public officials and public figures — since it is the 
person’s identity that gives the story its relevance.115 But in many cases, “there is no need 
to identify.”116 Bohlander suggests that “in the reporting about criminal offences, the 
name adds nothing but human interest to the story and is of no concern to the debate 
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about the substance,” and the “so-called ‘human interest’…more often than not equates to 
communal voyeurism.”117 
Bodahl-Johansen lists five considerations a newsroom may take into effect when 
naming.118 First, the degree of seriousness: 
All crimes are negative for society. Actions that deviate from social norm, 
must be discussed and explained. The more serious the case is, the more 
attention is needed. Knowledge of crime is important information to the 
public. Therefore, it may be necessary to tell who has committed criminal 
acts, although often it’s enough to [tell] which type of people ... commit 
crimes. 
 
Second, whether issue affects many people: “Criminal acts,” he said, “involving many 
people, are of big news interest. The need for information grows with volume and 
seriousness. Uncertainty [of] crimes creates insecurity.” Third, the need to know who 
may commit crimes: “The person’s identity can be important to explain and understand 
the action, especially if there is a connection between the person’s status and the crime.” 
Fourth, a legal security guarantee: 
Transparency in the administration of justice strengthens confidence in the 
police, prosecutors and the courts. Identification can also prevent 
speculation abouy innocent people. Openness about who is suspected, 
accused or charged with a crime, can provide new information that may be 
relevant to the case. 
 
The last consideration to perhaps name, he said, is suspicion against the innocent: 
“Incomplete information can cast suspicion on innocent people.” 
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One study found that after a crime has been committed, the chances of seeing a 
suspect’s name grows as a case proceeds through the criminal justice system.119 Over 
one-fifth (22.6%) of daily newspapers will print the name of a suspect as soon as it 
receives a police report naming a suspect; once an arrest has been made, 72.7% of papers 
say the suspect’s name will be printed. And after the individual has been formally 
charged and once a case goes to trial, 97.8% will publish the name. In the same study, 
77.4% of dailies said their decisions are based on formal policies, 17.8% said it’s made 
after a newsroom discussion, and only 5.6% indicated a combination of both. 120 
 But, there have been a number of instances where private individuals suspected of 
a crime but not formally charged have been the subject of press and government scrutiny. 
For these individuals caught up in an investigation — who are named merely as suspects 
in criminal cases, “the government and the press often present a formidable, albeit 
unwitting, alliance against the subject of such scrutiny, sometimes with disastrous 
results.”121 When police pinpoint but have not yet arrested a suspect, the newsroom can 
be facing “a nightmare choice,” where editors are “forced to walk the tightrope between 
when to name those accused of crimes and when to hold off.”122 These instances have 
been referred to as “tough calls,” which “post an oft-occurring dilemma in America’s 
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newsrooms.”123 These are situations raising the question about how far the press should 
go in reporting on criminal suspects who haven’t been charged formally.124 A few 
specific examples can illustrate this point.  
 In 1990, Robert Wayne O’Ferrell, an Enterprise, Alabama, resident, was 
suspected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of killing a federal judge and civil 
rights attorney with a mail bomb; the press received tips from the FBI of his involvement 
and ran stories on him. O’Ferrell lost his business, and his wife divorced him as a result 
of the publicity. The FBI, after concluding he was no longer a viable suspected, moved 
on and eventually captured the perpetrator.125  
 In 1996, a bomb exploded in Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park during the 
Olympic Games, killing and injuring a number of visitors to the park. Richard Jewell had 
first noticed the bomb and helped clear the crowd. The Atlanta Journal reported that 
Jewell was being investigated by the FBI as a suspect, citing leaks from the FBI. He was 
hounded by the media for weeks, and his employment prospects dwindled. He was never 
indicted for the crime and sued a number of media organizations for defamation, many of 
which settled for undisclosed amounts.126 
 In 2006 at a house party in Durham, North Carolina, three white Duke lacrosse 
players were accused of rape by Crystal Gail Mangum, a black stripper, dancer, and 
escort. The district attorney in the case, Mike Nifong, was quite vocal in the national 
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media against these three individuals as he pushed for sexual assault charges, even as 
mounting evidence (or lack thereof) and inconsistencies in Mangum’s various testimonies 
continued to surface. The media had negatively portrayed the players, who themselves 
were continuously castigated on campus and by the African-American community as 
well as shunned by the university president and professors. Nifong was later disbarred, 
and the state attorney general announced the three were “innocent.”127  
 Some newsrooms are concerned with keeping up with a story because the 
suspect's name “was of community interest,” according to Strupp and Phillips’ 
examination of times when newsrooms name suspects. Others don’t act until “official 
action” (i.e., release by the police or prosecutor) has been taken and will stick by this 
decision no matter what. Or, the decision to release a suspect’s name has to be weighed 
against “the public good.” Another example is how well known the suspect is — the 
more well known, the more likely to withhold naming them. Most, however, “say the 
decision needs to be based on the circumstances of the moment: who is accused, how 
many people are affected, and how ‘on-the-record’ law enforcement is willing to be.” 
One point of contention is that while most newspapers say they will wait until after the 
suspect has been cited by official sources or after an arrest or indictment is made, these 
same newspapers disagree over when to name one using off-the-record sources.128 
 This latter point has been described as “the greatest moral test in journalism.” For 
the press, “the act of attribution has the ability to transform the most mundane crime into 
a ‘good story.’ For the individual, it can ruin a life.” The issue of public safety is one 
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reason newsrooms release a suspect’s name delivered via an anonymous source, one 
where “tying a human persona to a salacious incident is often hung on ‘sources say’ or 
‘according to officials who have asked to remain anonymous.’” In these situations, 
morality and ethics are set aside for a more practical justification, a “razor’s 
edge…sharpened on the whetstone of First Amendment law: Could the newspaper 
survive a libel lawsuit…if the suspect identified turns out to be innocent? Answer ‘Yes’ 
to that,” Moscou says, “and the name is often a go.”129 Another question newspapers 
typically may ask is whether the information is “‘of legitimate concern to the public,’ — 
i.e., whether it is newsworthy.”130 The term refers to a journalistic privilege and defense 
in privacy torts and can take three different roads of public concern: whether the publicity 
is in the public interest, whether the individual is a public official/figure, or whether the 
material was taken exclusively from a public record.131 If a particular disclosure is 
newsworthy, than that case can be dismissed, as the information released satisfied the 
newsworthy test.132 Information is of public concern when “the public has a proper 
interest in learning about (it).”133 For example, Solove suggests looking at the 
Restatement of Torts and how it distinguished between “information to which the public 
is entitled” and “morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with 
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had 
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no concern.”134 What is of interest to most of society — such as a criminal suspect or 
arrestee’s name — is not the same question as what is of legitimate public concern.135 It 
is possible people want to hear a story even when they do not consider it of legitimate 
public concern.136 William Brown, a former vice president for news at the Montgomery, 
Ala., Advertiser recalled coverage of O'Ferrell: “As long as we have a free press, there 
always will be a multiplicity of decisions as to what is the right thing to do.”… “The 
realities of modern media make it more difficult for you to set your standards and 
absolutely stick with them. Philosophically, that's not a great excuse for editors to violate 
their standards, but concretely, I think that can become the case.”137 
While it has been a longstanding moral issue when it comes to reporting a name 
regardless of who releases it, if it is obtained from documents constituting “judicial 
notice” — affidavits, civil claims, criminal charges, disposition, police reports, 
subpoenas, etc. — it’s been legally safe to report the names involved in the document, 
even from sealed court documents leaked to the press.138 But then the question becomes 
whether the information provided in these documents is correct. Additionally, a number 
of private individuals who have been suspected or even arrested and formally charged 
have not only been the “subject of far-reaching investigations by federal law enforcement 
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officers (though ultimately exonerated) … [but] were covered extensively by the press, 
and their lives were profoundly and negatively affected as a result.”139  
To help newsrooms confront any ethical conundrums when it comes to naming 
criminal suspects or arrestees, the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) established a 
code of ethics — a code that is not legally enforceable due to the First Amendment.  
SPJ’s Code of Ethics is “voluntarily embraced by thousands of journalists, 
regardless of place or platform, and is widely used in newsrooms and classrooms as guide 
for ethical behavior”; the Code is not to be intended as a set of rules but “as a source for 
ethical decision-making.”140 SPJ’s Code, according to former SPJ Ethics Committee 
chairman Jay Black, is “intended to serve as ‘guiding principles as people sift and sort 
through the tough calls.’”141 Under the heading of “Minimize Harm,” the Code suggests 
“journalists treat sources, subjects and colleagues as human beings deserving of 
respect.”142 Members of the press — on a general level — should, among other points: 
“Show compassion for those who may be affected adversely by news coverage”; 
“Recognize that gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort”; 
“Only an overriding public need can justify intrusion into anyone’s privacy”; “Show 
good taste”; and “Avoid pandering to lurid curiosity.”143 Specifically with regard to 
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criminal suspects, however, the SPJ Code states journalists should “Be judicious about 
naming criminal suspects before the formal filing of charges.”144 
As exceptions to the general rule, a few newspapers do offer their own individual 
ethical guidelines on coverage of criminal suspects and arrestees — Los Angeles Times, 
Orlando Sentinel (both owned by the Tribune Company), and The News & Observer 
(McClatchy Company). Also, the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) offers 
some ethical guidance as well. While only a small sampling out of scores of papers, what 
is available is insightful.145 
The Los Angeles Times, for example, “does not identify suspects of criminal 
investigations who have not been charged or arrested.” But, on occasion, “the 
prominence of the suspect or the importance of the case will warrant an exception to this 
policy.” In those instances, the newsroom must take “great care” that the sourcing “is 
reliable and that law enforcement officials have a reasonable basis for considering the 
individual a suspect.” If someone the paper has identified as a suspect ultimately is not 
charged, the paper should make that know in a follow-up story, where the follow-up 
“should be played comparably to the original story if possible.”146 The Orlando Sentinel 
simply states “Generally, adult criminal suspects may be identified only when charges 
have been filed…Exceptions must be approved by the Managing Editor or Editorial Page 
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Editor.”147 The News & Observer notes that in the interest of fairness, “we shall seek to 
report the eventual outcome of any criminal charges that we report. This is particularly 
important in cases in which an individual is exonerated.”148 ASNE states that persons 
“publically accused should be given the earliest opportunity to respond.”149  
 
Identification by the police and prosecutors 
Publicly naming criminal suspects and arrestees by the government has been 
justified on a number of grounds: public safety, evidence gathering, “informed living,” 
and public oversight. 
 Because the government's primary responsibility is to protect its citizens, it 
“should inform the public when it suspects someone of criminal activity so that people 
may take measures to avoid possible harm — physical, financial, or other — from the 
suspect.”150 The second reason — evidence gathering — is investigative in nature: 
“naming a suspect or arrestee invites people with relevant information to come forward, 
thus providing additional witnesses or other evidence, which could be inculpatory or 
exculpatory of the named accusee.”151 A third reason people should be told of 
government suspicions regarding an arrestee or suspect is so they can practice “informed 
living” — “the right to exercise an informed choice of those with whom they live, 
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associate, etc.” Last, the government should arguably have to name criminal arrestees and 
suspects so that people “can meaningfully participate in the operation of the criminal 
justice system and effectuate its right to self-governance — i.e., under common law and 
constitutional doctrines of public access to government information and proceedings.”152 
 Naming suspects or arrestees due to public safety concerns is perhaps the 
government’s strongest rationale. But, with respect to an arrestee — especially those who 
may be a danger to society — public safety concerns “have presumably been satisfied by 
the arrest itself and will be further addressed in judicial hearings should the government 
seek to hold the arrestee in custody before trial.”153 The police themselves name suspects 
before they are arrested — “but only rarely is it because the suspect is dangerous and at-
large.”154  
Naming suspects or arrestees due to enhanced evidence gathering on the part of 
the police or prosecutor, according to New York Law School Professor Sadiq Reza, is 
both problematic in practice and theory. While police might choose to identify suspects 
and arrestees publicly, “the press makes the more meaningful decision of who among 
those identified will make the evening news or morning papers, and how much attention 
those individuals receive.”155 Therefore, he says, a genuine interest in gathering evidence 
and a more productive method would be if the police would keep control over the 
meaningful potion of the publicity decision instead of the press. The government could 
solicit evidence against suspects and arrestees by purchasing space in the newspaper and 
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naming them there, much as it does when it announces auctions or forfeitures of seized 
property.156 That the government doesn’t do this as a routine matter suggests three 
interrelated possibilities: “first, that the government does not allocate the funds to 
purchase such publicity; second, that it does not consider such publicity a particularly 
productive investigative tool in the everyday case; and third, that it would just as soon let 
the press make the publicity decision and, accordingly, bear the costs of publicity.”157 All 
these possibilities, however, point to the conclusion that “evidence gathering is not a 
particularly high priority on the government’s list of reasons for naming criminal 
arrestees and suspects.”158 
 “Informed living” is the desire "to exercise an informed choice about those with 
whom they live an associate,” and naming suspects and arrestees is the government’s way 
of letting people practice this.159 However, while the government’s naming in this way 
may not violate the presumption of innocence as a matter of constitutional law, its 
naming them, according to Reza, “guts the presumption as a matter of social policy,” 
such that “many people assume arrestees are guilty whether or not they have been 
convicted.”160 For the government to name suspects and arrestees for the very purpose of 
encouraging this assumption dishonors the spirit of presumption of innocence and 
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encourages the public to so the same.161 Here, protecting individuals against these 
judgments “is all the more important because news of an individual’s arrest or suspicion 
is rarely followed by equal coverage of her exoneration or acquittal. Moreover, while 
news of one’s arrest or suspicion is technically true, its dissemination … is all the more 
likely to trigger unjustified misjudgments about the individual.”162 
 Lastly, the government’s reasons for naming suspects and arrestees is such that 
“the public may effectively monitor the government and participate in it.”163 The question 
of whether public access to the names of suspects and arrestees is legally required is 
entwined with the question of whether the names of these private individuals are 
“newsworthy” for constitutional or common-law purposes.164 “Inevitably,” according to 
Reza, “the question of newsworthiness of the names of criminal arrestees and suspects for 
public disclosure purposes must be determined by balancing the public interest against 
the privacy interest.”165 
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CHAPTER IV 
PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 
 
Background 
 The origins and evolution of the idea that the public has an enforceable right to 
know have less to do with constitutional history than with the public’s and, most 
especially, news publishers’ understanding of the role of the First Amendment during its 
formulation.166 While the public's right to know had been debated in the federal and state 
constitutional conventions during the country’s founding, it wasn’t until the middle of the 
twentieth century that the idea became “politically potent, registered by legislation 
designed to ensure governmental openness” under the guise that a right to know is 
constitutionally enforceable against the government.167 
 Initially, the idea of “free flow of information” — a more popular term than “right 
to know” throughout the 1940s and 1950s — meant “assuring free and uncensored 
transmission of news at the international level.”168 In 1944, the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) formed a Committee on World Freedom of Information, the 
goal of which was “to ensure that post-war nationalism would not raise barriers to the 
free flow of information among nations.”169 Teel wrote the committee was designed “to 
promote the Western view that freedom of the press could prevent dictatorships and war 
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… (and) to establish a Western-style global information order for the for the postwar 
world.”170  
 It was in this context that Kent Cooper, executive director of the Associated Press 
in the 1940s, used the phrase “right to know” in a speech on January 23, 1945, in which 
he argued: “The citizen is entitled to have access to news, fully and accurately presented. 
There cannot be political freedom in one country, or in the world, without respect for ‘the 
right to know.’”171 But the phrase didn’t gain traction until American journalists realized 
early in the Cold War the problems they faced in gaining access to information related to 
atomic energy and other matters.172 
 ASNE commissioned Harold Cross, legal counsel for the New York Herald 
Tribune and professor at the Columbia University School of Law, to prepare a report on 
the federal, state, and municipal information procedures, policies, and practices.173 
According to Wiggins, however, the “fountainheads” of the right to know movement 
included both Cross and James S. Pope,174 a member of ASNE’s Committee of Freedom 
of Information (renamed from its previous name, the Committee on World Freedom and 
Information) who later became chairman in 1950. Pope had asked Cross to write a 
scholarly, legally documented report on the public’s interest in open government, one that 
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“will serve as a beacon to every editor who collides with the red-tape curtain with which 
so many officers of government try to shroud their official actions.”175 
 The right to know movement officially got started in 1953 with the publication of 
Cross’ The People's Right to Know,176 where he emphasized that his book was “a call to 
battle”177 that was “aimed primarily at the needs of news editors and reporters.”178 The 
book proved highly influential because of both “the systematic nature of the study and his 
conclusions about the status of public access to government information.”179  
 In the book, he emphasized that “Public business is the public's business. The 
people have the right to know.”180 Citizens of any self-governing society “must have the 
legal right to examine and investigate the conduct of its affairs, subject only to those 
limitations imposed by the most urgent public necessity.”181 These legal rights, too, 
“must be elevated to a position of the highest sanction if the people are to enter into full 
enjoyment of their right to know.”182 He saw the function of news as involving the 
“sharing in these rights and the duty to exercise them continuously, vigorously, fearlessly 
and justly.”183 But, while the legal rights of the makers of newspapers “can rise no higher 
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than their source — the rights of all citizens, taxpayers, and electors engaged in lawful 
private enterprise of high public importance,” he noted that they “can be no less, and they 
may not be much different.”184  
 Throughout the 1950s, following not only Cross and Pope’s mobilization efforts 
and the publication of the book, the public's right to know was championed by the press 
in “combating syndromes of bureaucratic secrecy” — secrecy prompted as much by 
governmental practices following World War II as by what Max Weber identified as the 
bureaucratic phenomenon of “official secrets” — that is, the tendency of “every 
bureaucracy (to) seek … to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by 
keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.”185 In particular, Wiggins, executive 
director of The Washington Post and Times Herald and chairman of ASNE’s Committee 
on Freedom of Information after Pope, argued the public’s right to know refers to a 
composite of  
at least five broad, discernible components: 1. the right to get information; 
2. the right to print without prior restraint; 3. the right to print without fear 
of reprisal not under due process; 4 the right of access to facilities and 
material essential to communication; and 5. the right to distribute 
information without interference by government acting under law or by 
citizens acting in defiance of the law.186 
 
 In the late 1950s, Cross’ work served as the basis for the press’ campaign for the 
enactment of state and federal freedom of information laws. Pope said before a 
Congressional subcommittee that he did not believe that “the people who wrote our 
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Constitution would be stupid enough to guarantee that you could print anything you 
could get and at the same time give a license to the people in Government to keep away 
from the people anything they could.”187 The right to know, he said, “is the right of the 
people.”188 
 After a number of years of political struggles in Congress and against the 
background of administrative and executive officials’ opposition, enactment of the 
Freedom of Information Act resulted, which remains “the basic legislative mandate for 
ensuring governmental openness and the political ideal of the public's right to know.”189 
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, members of the press endeavored to further 
enlarge the scope of the First Amendment by contending this amendment embodies an 
enforceable constitutional right to know.190 As cases were handed down during this time, 
constitutional scholars boldly proclaimed that the Supreme Court had fashioned a “new” 
press guarantee in its decisions during this time, such that the right to know had now 
become “an emerging constitutional right”; Emerson asserts specifically that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had “recognized a constitutional guarantee of the right to know.”191  
 But O’Brien argues that assessment is neither correct nor accurate — even today. 
In constitutional politics, claims made to the public’s right to know “nevertheless appear 
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neither defensible nor salutary in terms of constitutional history, developing 
constitutional law, or considerations of public policy.”192 A directly enforceable public's 
right to know “has no basis in the text or historical background of either the Constitution 
or the First Amendment ... Rather, constitutional history and judicial politics demonstrate 
that the public’s right to know is an important abstract right within (this) background.”193 
Accordingly, the First Amendment “literally and as judicially enforced only indirectly, 
derivatively ensures the political ideal of the public’s right to know.”194 
 Political and constitutional controversies over the public’s right to know primarily 
arise “from the failure to attend to the foundations for claiming a constitutional right to 
know.”195 The press and constitutional scholars advocating the public’s right to know 
“fundamentally err” by failing to distinguish the public’s right to know as an “abstract 
political right” — a “bulwark” for freedom of information — from concrete rights 
embodied in the First Amendment.196 Dworkin explained the difference between the two: 
An abstract right is a general political aim the statement of which 
does not indicate how that general aim is to be weighted or 
compromised in particular circumstances against other political 
aims. Concrete rights…are political aims that are more precisely 
defined so as to express more definitely the weight they may have 
against other political aims on particular occasions. …Abstract 
rights…provide arguments for concrete rights, but the claim of a 
concrete right is more definite than any claim of abstract right that 
supports it.197 
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Abstract rights can then be said to be “unconditional and unqualified,” where as concrete 
rights are “qualified by competing moral, legal, or political considerations.”198 That is, 
the former can serve as important arguments for the legitimacy of the latter. So, while the 
public’s right to know as an abstract right provides powerful arguments for extending 
concrete rights guaranteed by the First Amendment (i.e., freedom of speech and press), it 
by itself does not mandate a concrete constitutional right to know, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized.199 
 
How the public’s right to know can be used to justify identifying suspects or arrestees 
 The principle of the public’s right to know now serves as a core element of the 
journalism ethos, one routinely motivating and justifying a wide range of journalistic 
behavior — behavior that without such a justification would be regarded as unethical 
(e.g., invading privacy).200 The appeal to this principle provides a greater good defense, 
giving what Meyers thinks is “journalists (supposed) valid moral reasons for engaging in 
what would otherwise be seen as improper behavior.”201 Although, too, individuals will 
sometimes be harmed in the pursuit and coverage of news, resulting harms are seen to be 
justified by the promotion of this powerful social good. While the public’s right to know 
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can justify some harmful journalistic behavior, “too often it is used without the necessary 
conceptual precision and clarity.”202  
 Some commentators find claims by the press to a right to know “self-serving and 
pernicious.”203 Merrill argues that defenders of press freedom “have appropriated the 
expression because it sounds more democratic than the simple term ‘freedom of the 
press’ and shifts the theoretical emphasis from a private and restricted institution (the 
press) to a much broader and popular base (the citizenry).”204 Likewise, the Court of 
Common Pleas of Ohio observed:  
The so-called ‘right of the public to know’ is a rationlization [sic] 
developed  by the fourth estate to gain rights not shared by others 
... to imporve [sic] its private ability to acquire information which 
is a raw asset of its business. ... The constitution does not appoint 
the fourth estate the spokesmen [sic] of the people. The people 
speak through the elective process and through th eindividuals [sic] 
it elects to positions created for that purpose. The press has no 
right that exceeds that of other citizens.205 
 
Even Hocking in a 1947 report from ASNE’s Commission on Freedom of the Press 
noted: “We say recklessly that [readers] have ‘right to know’; yet it is a right which they 
are helpless to claim, for they do not know that they have the right to know what as yet 
they do not know.”206 
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 Ultimately, journalists, according to Meyers, “often confuse having a right to 
know with having an interest or curiosity in knowing.”207 Rights and interests, O’Brien 
writes, are different. When the press makes the claim that the public has a right to know, 
they are making “propositional claims about the interests of a third party”208 — that is, 
citizens. Accordingly, they cannot show that “acknowledgement of the public’s right to 
know will vindicate the interests of the public or guarantee an informed public.”209 In 
claiming a public’s right to know, the press also cannot demonstrate that the public has 
interests in knowing about some particular item or issue: “An individual’s interest in 
knowing about particular issues neither entitles the press to claim the public’s right to 
know and to demand access to everything pertinent to the issues nor guarantees that an 
individual informed of such matters will be an informed individual.”210 In other words, 
the right to know does not apply to any or all information.211 As Bathory and McWilliams 
contend, “Vindicating the ‘public’s right to know’ does not require that all specialized, 
private, and relatively inaccessible information be ‘made public.’”212 It demands that the 
public have access to those necessary facts for public judgment about “public things,” 
and, too, that this same public has the greatest possible opportunity to learn and master 
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the “art of political judgment.”213 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson understood as 
well that the new republic depended on information “not as secured by a right to know 
vicariously asserted by members of the press, but, instead, as secured by the freedom of 
speech and press and as reinforced by public education and citizen participation in the 
affairs of governance.”214 
 The public’s right to know what is essential to public affairs — whether defined 
relative to “the decisions and actions of its political leaders” or to “public issues” — does 
not extend to everything.215 It is not absolute, in that it must be balanced against other 
competing moral considerations.216 Both Milton and Mills recognized the need to weight 
the right to know against other moral concerns. Mill explicitly makes this point of 
exception, which follows his defense of The Liberty of Thought and Discussion: 
Even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in 
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression 
a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that 
corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is 
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through 
the press, but may incur just punishment when delivered orally to 
an excited mob assembled before the house of the corn dealer, or 
when handed about among the same mob in the form of a 
placard.217 
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 But, the balancing is not a simple task, and when a competing moral claim is 
discovered, its relative strength must be weighed against the existing right to know.218 
 Related to this point is journalists’ appeal to a morally neutral stance of “run the 
story and let the readers decide,” which, in fact, isn’t neutral — the decision to print first 
and ask questions later “assumes that the information in question is valuable,” at least 
enough to justify the expense of obtaining and printing it.219 The assumption, according 
to Meyers, “entails an implicit, and sometimes explicit, value judgment that the 
information is worth knowing,” that is, the assumption is not morally neutral.220 
Journalists acting this way serve their “self-interest” by allowing them to get the 
“compelling, dramatic story without having to fret over moral principles”; it is also part 
of the journalistic ethos that the public’s right to know be seen as a fact, not a value.221 In 
other words, the public’s right to know has taken on the status of “common sense,” 
according to Tuchmann, in that it is so obvious as to be taken for granted as a part of the 
way things are and not as a judgment that needs to be determined and made a subject of 
moral evaluation.222 
 So, not all factual information carries with it a corresponding right to know, but in 
those instances it does, journalists must determine how that right weighs against other 
competing moral claims, namely, privacy, reputation, and the presumption of innocence 
— the topics of which are addressed in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER V 
PRIVACY 
 
 As far back as 1964223 and as recognizably important as it was then as it is now, 
there is still no single definition of privacy. “The social value or interest we call privacy,” 
he wrote, “is not an independent one, but is only a composite of the value our society 
places on protecting mental tranquility, reputation, and intangible forms of property.” 
Fried reiterated the point, saying that “privacy is not just one possible means among 
others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and relations of 
the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship, and trust.”224 Thompson went 
straight to the matter, writing that “Perhaps the most striking thing about the right of 
privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is.”225 From a legal point 
of view, privacy consists of four or five “different species” of legal rights quite distinct 
from one another and thus incapable of a single, concise definition — but each is 
“heavily interrelated as a matter of history, such that efforts to completely sever one from 
another are (and have been) disastrous.”226 
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At its worst, according to Yeager, “privacy is a greedy concept that promotes 
hypersensitivity or an unjustified wish to manipulate and defraud others.”227 Westin 
identified privacy with “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.”228 Cate has claimed that is it important to analyze and develop privacy values 
because “privacy is not an end in itself but rather an instrument for achieving other 
goals.”229 Allen suggested one meaningful way for privacy theorists to advance 
scholarship on the subject is to “clearly explicate the costs, benefits, and values 
associated with whatever ‘privacy’ is intended to denote.”230  
A number of disciplines, though — law, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and 
psychology — have addressed privacy in a number of different ways, as a condition,231 
space,232 or claim233 for individuals to enjoy physical, mental, and emotional realms 
where they can individually or socially flourish autonomously — realms where they may 
be free from political and social pressure.234  
Privacy can be divided into both individual and societal values. With the former, 
one’s core identity — that is, personhood — is recognized as being integrally related to 
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the values of autonomy,235 liberty,236 emotional release,237 personal growth and self-
evaluation,238 and psychic self-preservation.239 How these privacy values taken together 
currently protect various individuals within the criminal justice system will be addressed 
toward the end of this chapter.  
 
Privacy as it benefits individuals   
Scholarship has described an essential value for privacy as personhood or 
selfhood, which include the integrated values of personality, dignity, independence, 
individuality, and identity.240
 
Warren and Brandeis’ article, “The Right to Privacy,” 
considered the origin of American privacy law, admonished newspaper journalists and 
photographers for intruding in their and other individuals’ personal affairs and harming 
individuals’ “inviolate personality.”241
 
Their examination built upon Judge Thomas M. 
Cooley’s conception of privacy, which connoted bodily integrity: “The right to one’s 
person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.”242 Warren and 
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Brandeis’ article called for the law to expand to protect the right of individuals “to be let 
alone,” suggesting that privacy would protect individuals against intrusions by society 
and the press as well as the demands of collective life.243
 
Bloustein described Warren and 
Brandeis’ vision of privacy law as a method of protecting an “individual’s independence, 
dignity and integrity.”244
 
Suggesting privacy is a shield for individuals’ interest in human 
dignity, he proposed that the key privacy value of personhood “defines man’s essence as 
a unique and self-determining being.”245 Kahn suggested that maintaining and developing 
one’s sense of dignity and integrity are key aspects of identity, which itself is considered 
a key underlying principle for privacy.246 The personhood value therefore protects 
individuals’ ability to define their own identity as they perceive themselves as being 
distinct from other members of society.247 
The personhood — or core self — value in addition to the autonomy value are 
both grounded in Goffman’s suggestions that an individual desires to control others’ 
perceptions of himself, where he/she typically has multiple identities presented at 
different times and in different contexts.248 Westin similarly observed, “Each person is 
aware of the gap between what he wants to be and what he actually is, between what the 
world sees of him and what he knows to be his much more complex reality.”249
 
Jourard 
explained that adults are expected to perform certain social roles; that is, when an adult’s 
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conduct deviates in a noticeable way from a pattern of socially expected behavior, the 
nonconforming adult may be socially sanctioned.250
 
However, the adult who strives 
instead to constantly conform to social expectations, suppressing contradictory desires, 
risks “self-alienation,” which essentially undermines physical and mental health.251
 
Privacy, therefore, provides individuals with opportunities to experience and reflect on 
their own uniqueness as a human being without exposing their core self to society. 
Related to this point, the desire to protect individuality is integrally related to the 
value of autonomy.252 Whereas the personhood value of privacy emphasizes one’s 
essence as a human being, the autonomy value stresses one’s independence from 
judgment as well as one’s ability to choose whether to resist pressures to conform to 
social norms.253
 
Westin described autonomy as “the desire to avoid being manipulated or 
dominated wholly by others.”254
 
Gavison asserted, “Autonomy requires the capacity to 
make an independent moral judgment, the willingness to exercise it, and the courage to 
act on the results of this exercise even when the judgment is not a popular one.”255
 
Rosen 
suggested the autonomy value of privacy means that each individual is capable of 
realizing “a self-actualized individual self” — a self choosing to assert uniqueness as an 
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individual as well as a member of society.256
 
Accordingly, privacy helps individuals 
exercise self-determination and make independent judgments.257 
The value of autonomy also is related to the third individual value of privacy— 
liberty.258
 
While conceptions of privacy as control over information about oneself may 
relate to autonomy or personhood, other scholars instead have claimed those conceptions 
relate more correctly to a liberty value of privacy.259
 
Fried suggested privacy allows 
individuals to do or say things that would be scorned or scrutinized by the general public 
without “fear of disapproval or more tangible retaliation.”260
 
Parent argued that such 
conceptions of privacy as control over information about oneself ultimately relate to 
personal freedom, that is, liberty: “Whenever one person or group of persons tries to 
deprive another of control over some aspect of his life, we should recognize this as 
attempted coercion and should evaluate it as such, under the general concept of freedom-
limiting action.”261
 
Gavison labeled this value “liberty of action,” which combines the 
individual values of freedom from censure or ridicule, promotion of autonomy, and 
promotion of mental health.262
 
The key underlying principle of the liberty value is this: 
Liberty insulates individuals from authoritarian interferences, (e.g., government restraints 
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and societal pressures) and allows individuals to challenge social norms in private — free 
from pressures to conform in public.263 
The fourth individual value of privacy, emotional release, has two key parts for 
individuals.264
 
The first allows individuals to escape the stress and tensions resulting from 
one’s performance in various social roles “depending on his audience and behavioral 
situation.”265
 
That function enables individuals to relax and thus drop their own social 
personas, which is essential for physical and emotional health.266
 
Westin examined and 
compared the second function of the emotional release value to a safety valve primarily 
benefiting individuals, whereas the safety valve function of freedom of speech primarily 
benefits society. In this way, he suggested, privacy allows individuals to voice anger and 
frustration at authority figures to friends or family “without fear of being held responsible 
for such comments.”267
 
Such venting helps individuals process emotions in a safe 
context, reducing the risk they will spout off harmful statements in a context likely to 
violate their professional or broad social roles.268
 
Both parts of the emotional release 
value ultimately benefit individuals’ mental and physical health.269 
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Freedom to process one’s thoughts and reflect on one’s own emotions is essential, 
too, for the personal growth and self-evaluation value of privacy.270 Westin also claimed 
privacy helps individuals find opportunities for processing the deluge of information 
encountered during daily life and “to integrate [their] experiences into a meaningful 
pattern.”271
 
Bok wrote that privacy is “the condition of being protected from unwanted 
access by others — either physical access, personal information, or attention.”272 
Reflecting on personal experiences is necessary for individuals to grow through self-
discovery and self-criticism.273
 
Evaluating thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs is another 
essential need for individuals to practice as well as prepare how and when to present 
themselves in public.274
 
The process of self-evaluation ultimately helps each person feel 
confident as an autonomous being.275  
The final individual value for privacy — self-preservation and emotional health 
— is closely related to the values of personal autonomy, self-evaluation, and emotional 
release. Westin described a function of limited and protected communication as “the 
means of psychic self-preservation for men in the metropolis.”276
 
That is, individuals use 
reserve and discretion to decide what conduct and communications to share — but only 
within the parameters of trusted relationships — because wide exposure to the general 
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public would cause psychological pain. For example, when Warren and Brandeis called 
for a legal right of privacy, they asserted that “modern enterprise and invention have, 
through invasions upon his privacy, subjected [individuals] to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”277
 
They argued that the 
underlying value for individual privacy, which allowed individuals to prevent the press 
from disclosing their information, is “peace of mind.”278 
 
How privacy is protected for individuals in the criminal justice system 
Post proposed that modern privacy law “safeguards the rules of civility” defining 
the social norms, or standards of propriety each community member is expected to 
follow.279
 
He also claimed privacy law attempts to address violations of social rules 
causing psychological injuries, including mental anguish or dignitary harms; other type of 
violation includes degradations of individuals and society arising when community 
members fail to extend a basic form of respect that standards of decency, which are social 
standards that may vary from community to community, suggest any member of a 
community deserves.280
 
Such displays of disrespect, he asserts, demean not only the 
individuals involved but also society by defying fundamental levels of moral treatment 
essential for individuals to coexist in a community — one valuing personal growth, 
autonomy, and meaningful human relationships.281  
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 Because such displays of disrespect or harm to reputation can have negative 
effects on individuals, especially those within the criminal justice system, statutes have 
recognized that these individuals are entitled to keep information about their involvement 
in criminal proceedings private: sexual assault victims;282 juvenile offenders; grand jury 
proceedings; arrest records; subjects of wiretaps, bankruptcy proceedings, and certain 
immigration proceedings. Other forms of statutory protection have been extended to 
include accusees in quasi-criminal proceedings, like judges accused of alleged 
misconduct, parties’ names in civil suits arising out of criminal cases (i.e., when 
individuals seek civil redress for wrongs inflicted during a criminal investigation but 
want to hide the fact they faced an investigation), parents in dependency hearings who 
were accused of abuse, and doctors and lawyers (i.e., legally licensed professions) facing 
professional disciplinary proceedings.283 Support for withholding names under privacy 
grounds has also applied to arrestees — ironically, at the behest of the government.284  
 What is enlightening about these statutes is how they do not threaten the First 
Amendment and the press because they apply just to government actors, which leaves the 
press free to identify suspects or arrestees if such information is somehow otherwise 
obtained (e.g, leaked).285 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly advised 
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states that if they want to protect the privacy of individuals named in government 
proceedings and records, such as those named above, they should do so by crafting 
statutes that withhold information from the public.286 
 This right of privacy for these individuals is embedded in informational privacy of 
common-law origin; the core of informational privacy is a person’s control over the 
dissemination of information about him or her to others.287 Warren and Brandeis’ 1890 
article seeking a “right to be let alone” in cases of invasion of privacy eventually took 
hold in the legal system, allowing for the eventual development of Prosser’s quartet of 
common law privacy torts,288 in addition to a vast body of federal and state statutes 
protecting individuals from the public disclosure of personal information by government 
officials or citizens.289 Justification for this protection of privacy comes in various 
forms,290 the types of which are addressed in the above section on how privacy benefits 
individuals. But within these justifications is the notion that informational privacy is 
about one’s ability to protect his/her reputation by maintaining control over information 
about actions, habits, character, and other personal matters — the disclosure of which 
may prove embarrassing or unflattering to the individual in question and may interfere 
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with his/her personal relationships or professional standing.291 Flattering information is 
subject to privacy protection as well.292  
 Whatever the content of information, though, privacy means an individual's 
control over how, when, and to whom information is divulged. Moreover, information 
about a person need not be false or misleading to invoke privacy protection; while 
common-law privacy doctrine does encompass this possibility, its overwhelming focus is 
on truthful or accurate information about a person.293 In other words, the land of 
informational privacy is a land of truths about a person that the person has a right to keep 
others from knowing.294 
 With regard to individuals suspected of or arrested for a crime, the fact that 
stigma attaches to them is well recognized.295 How this relates to reputation will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
REPUTATION 
 
Reputation is one of our “most cherished assets,” as it “is an essential component 
to our freedom, for without the good opinion of our community, our freedom can become 
empty.”296 Our desire of the esteem of others, too, “is as real a want of nature as 
hunger.”297 Individuals form their own selfhood based on how they think others perceive 
them. 298 Bellah argues that “(r)eputation is the extension and elaboration of that 
recognition which lies at the basis of our social existence.”299 Reputation can be a key 
dimension of our self, something affecting the very core of human identity.300 Beyond its 
influence on personal self-conception, reputation affects our ability to engage in basic 
activities in society, in addition to depending upon others to engage in transactions, 
employment, and friendships:  
 
Without the cooperation of others in society, we often are unable to do 
what we want to do. Without the respect of others, our actions and 
accomplishments can lose their purpose and meaning. Without the 
appropriate reputation, our speech, though free, may fall on deaf ears. Our 
freedom, in short, depends in part upon how others in society judge us.301 
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 Reputation can be viewed as the glue connecting social relationships. But, it has 
been viewed as antiquated and outdated, no longer relevant in an increasingly mobile 
world.302 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, sees reputation as a wholly justifiable 
concept: “The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified 
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential 
dignity and worth of every human being — a concept at the root of any decent system of 
ordered liberty.”303 
Throughout human history, the opinions of us held by others have played a central 
role in defining us.304 Maintaining a good reputation typically required constant vigilance 
to protect one’s honor in the eyes of others.305 Philosophers and literary figures have long 
understood this relationship. For example, Rousseau believed that no sooner did 
humankind emerge from the “state of nature” into communal existence than our need for 
reputation took hold: “Man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live 
in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own 
existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him.”306 Shakespeare 
characterizes “good name in man and woman” and the “immediate jewel of their 
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souls.”307 Moreover, as highlighted in Othello, reputation has also long been viewed as an 
immortal part of a person.308 Indeed, reputation may be the only thing that survives us 
after death.309  
While reputation is a fundamental component of self-identity, it is not something 
created for ourselves or pulled completely from our environment.310 In many ways, 
reputation is a quintessential societal good, that is, it is created in cooperation with others 
and relative to our relationship with them.311 For example, an unknown hermit living in a 
mountain cave has no reputation; it is only through his interaction with others that his 
reputation is formed. Still, reputation is a fundamental component of self-identity, so that 
how we see others is often a reflection of how we perceive that others see us.312 James 
wrote that “a man’s Self is the sum total of what he call his, not only his body and his 
psychic powers, but his clothes and his house…his reputation and works…If they wax 
and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down.”313  
Reputation can therefore be a manifestation of social relationships between 
individuals.314 As Nock defines it, reputation is “a shared, or collective perception about a 
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person.”315 Our reputations are forged when people make judgments based upon the 
mosaic of information available to us.316 
Identity is constructed through networks of social relationships and is learned and 
taught through a process of socialization and interaction with others — not in a 
vacuum.317 Goffman wrote that our identities are developed and maintained through the 
interaction and cooperation of others; each person has multiple identities presented in 
different environments, which are affected by others within those environments.318 For 
example, fads and fashion characterizes membership in various social groups where 
multiple identities are formed and affected by the groups themselves.319 
 Public and private lives are just dimensions in a complex, multifaceted 
personality, one that is shaped by the roles we play, where we express different aspects of 
our personalities in different relationships and various contexts.320 Ludwig argues the 
distinction is unnecessary: “Each self is as real to the person experiencing it and as much 
the product of natural forces as the other. All the distinction between a true and a false 
self signifies is a value judgment.”321 
As noted earlier, although parts of our identity can be created and controlled by 
us, reputation is the product of the judgment of others, such that while it is possible to 
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influence the inputs others use to assess our reputation, the ultimate opinions others hold 
of us, according to Solove, are outside our control.322 So, while we want some degree of 
control over our own reputation, we also want to know the reputation of others.323 While 
privacy — described as the other side of the reputational coin — gives people greater 
control over their reputations, it also “makes it difficult to know others’ reputations.”324 
Much is at stake in relationships with others, as we would be vulnerable to great loss if let 
down or betrayed; many times, people’s reputation is used to decide whether to trust 
them.325 According to Fukuyama, “Trust is the expectation that arises within a 
community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared 
norms, on the part of members of that community.”326 Nock observes, “Trust and the 
ability to take others at their word are basic ingredients in social order. If we never knew 
who to trust, we could never be sure that what we were told was true, or that promises 
made would be promises kept, there would be little to bind us together or make groups 
cohesive.”327 Information about others is needed to determine whether to trust our own 
safety in the hands of others or “entrust others with our finances, our deepest secrets, and 
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the care of our children.”328 One aspect of privacy is that it may inhibit the establishment 
of this trust because privacy "makes it difficult to know others’ reputations.”329  
 We constantly, metaphorically speaking, weigh other people, and it may at times 
be done quickly. Rosen points out that  
When intimate personal information circulates among a small group of 
people who know us well, its significance can be weighed against other 
aspects of our personality and character. By contrast, when intimate 
information is removed from its original context and revealed to strangers, 
we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the basis of our most 
embarrassing, and therefore most memorable, tastes and preferences.330  
 
What may make matters worse is that human judgment is imperfect, and judgments may 
be based on fragments of information taken out of context; knowledge of others can be 
riddled with gaps.331 In other words, conclusions may be leapt to prematurely.  
 
Reputational harm as it relates to the criminal justice system 
Because the benefits of reputation are dispersed among all members of the 
community, according to Solove, the effects of reputational injury are felt not just by the 
aggrieved individual but by the community as well:  
 
Distortion (of an individual's reputation) not only affects the aggrieved 
individual; it also affects the society that judges that individual; it 
interferes with our relationships to that individual, and it inhibits our 
ability to assess the character of those that we deal with. We are thus 
deceived in our relationships with others; these relationships are tainted by 
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false information that prevents us from making sound and fair 
judgments.332 
 
 In general, reputational harms have been shown to cost individuals money, their 
job, political power, and social contacts.333 They can induce depression, poor health, and 
divorce, as well as social exclusion.334 In the criminal justice system, to be arrested for a 
crime or suspected of committing one is an indisputable truth about an arrestee or 
suspect. But as noted in the previous chapter, it is also true the person suspected of a 
crime or arrested will almost always find this act embarrassing and unflattering, the 
disclosure of which may prove embarrassing or unflattering to the individual in question 
and may interfere with his personal relationships or his professional standing.335 Much 
like general reputational harms, in the criminal justice realm, “Personal ties can be 
strained, family members shunned, current employment lost and future job prospects 
threatened, social status damaged — and worse.”336 The fact that stigma attaches to one 
named as a criminal arrestee or suspect is well recognized in the court of law: “Arrest is a 
public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on 
bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his 
association, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his 
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friends.”337 There is, too, a deterrent value of stigma: It is the operating premise of law 
enforcement initiatives. 338 
 Ostracism flows from the mere fact of arrest—or even of potential arrest.339 
Although charges may later be dropped for a variety of reasons, as detailed in Chapter II, 
the stigma of association with the criminal process continues to linger.340 When these 
reputational harms linger — and it can be for years — doubts remain as to an individual’s 
guilt or innocence.341 Even when it is eventually possible to get past those doubts, “the 
emotional pain and social exclusion suffered will not be quickly forgotten, its wounds not 
easily healed.”342 Bald accusations and arrests rob the accused of whatever positive social 
status they may have had.343 Even the mere proximity to the criminal justice system is 
seen as “a fall from grace,” despite calls to the presumption of innocence.344 In high-
profile cases with long time spans, the defense may over time be able to offer a counter-
story, but early media coverage may have done much damage to an accused’s reputation 
along the way.345 
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CHAPTER VII 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
 
 The presumption of innocence — “The burden of proof rests on who asserts, not 
on who denies” — is one of the most familiar maxims in U.S. criminal law.346 It is 
perceived as a fundamental principle; in fact, “many would say that it is the foundational 
principle of criminal process.”347 The presumption is also “a moral and political principle, 
based on a widely shared conception of how a free society should exercise the power to 
punish.”348 
 The presumption can operate as two different conceptions — one is at the 
criminal trial, the other is throughout the criminal justice process more generally.349 The 
former and narrower conception is when a person is charged with a criminal offense, the 
prosecutor at trial bears the burden of proving guilt of that offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The latter conception supports a wider sense of presumption of innocence: Pre-
trial procedures should be conducted, so far as possible, as if the defendant were 
innocent, with the presumption acting as a restraint on various compulsory measures 
taken against suspects and arrestees in the period before trial.350 This conception also 
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“concerns the State’s duty to recognise the defendant’s legal status of innocence at all 
stages prior to conviction.”351  
 Historically in the United States, the latter conception was supported (and remains 
so in Europe), one where the presumption protected defendants from the time of being 
charged with a crime to trial,352 hovering over them, as it were, as a “guardian angel.”353 
In other words, the presumption of innocence was seen as a legal burden and, 
specifically, was separate and distinct from the equally fundamental principle that the 
prosecution at trial bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.354 However, 
since the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court began a shift to the former conception, merging 
the two principles — presumption of innocence and prosecutor’s burden or proof — into 
just the prosecutor’s burden at trial, which will be elaborated below; additionally, it was 
no longer required of trial courts to suggest to jurors that the defendant has the 
presumption of innocence.355 Later U.S. Supreme Court cases and changes in federal and 
state statutes in the years following continued to support this idea.356 
 Ashworth argues that the presumption of innocence “is inherent in any proper 
conception of the relationship between the State and its citizens in an ‘open and 
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democratic society.’”357 The government ought to treat each citizen as if he or she were 
innocent — regardless of how strong the apparent evidence — unless and until that 
particular citizen is convicted of a criminal offence.358 This is primarily because the 
government has been invested with “far-reaching powers of investigation, prosecution, 
trial and sentencing.”359 In a democratic society, though, the government is expected to 
exercise these powers according to certain standards, showing respect for the dignity as 
well as autonomy of each person.360 In other words, in order to protect an individual 
against “arbitrary and excessive state action,”361 the government should be required to 
provide acceptable reasons for exercising such power (e.g., detention for questioning or 
reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in the particular crime).362  
 As noted earlier, the principle of presumption of innocence in the United States at 
one time came into effect concretely from when a defendant was arrested and charged, 
protecting individuals from imprisonment (the exception were cases of capital crimes or 
risks of flight)363 unless there was confession in open court or proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial.364 When the shift of focus of this presumption of innocence 
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conception occurred, it leaned toward proving legal guilt at trial, with the presumption 
becoming synonymous with the prosecutor's burden to prove an individual guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.365 
 Some legal critics hold that the presumption of innocence has diminished in pre-
trial proceedings. The presumption has lost, as a result, its greater former meaning that 
the defendant was protected against any inferences or findings of guilt in the pre-trial 
phases.366 During all these stages, including arrest,367 the grand jury hearing,368 a pretrial 
detention hearing, a preliminary hearing,369 and during plea negotiations,370 there is no 
focus on the defendant's right to be presumed innocent.371 And while the U.S. Supreme 
Court has claimed the presumption of innocence is constitutionally rooted, it has 
specifically held that pretrial defendants do not have the right to be presumed innocent, 
and their detention in various contexts does not violate the U.S. Constitution.372    
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 Thus, the current definition of principle does not have the impact it once had.373 
According to Baradaran, the focus of pretrial protections for defendants should not be on 
obtaining the truth of a person's guilt or innocence, but should instead protect a 
defendant’s liberty until innocence or guilt can be proven at trial.374 
* * * 
 The last four chapters have been used to outline important principles to be taken 
into account by newsrooms when considering whether to identify in a news story a 
private individual who is suspected of or arrested for a crime. The chapter to follow 
shows how the decision to identify these individuals is approached in the Norwegian and 
the larger Scandinavian press. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
NORWEGIAN AND SCANDINAVIAN APPROACHES TO  
PRESS IDENTIFICATION 
 
 The Norwegian society and press place the privacy of individuals in a place of 
prominence in both the law and press ethics. What will be shown in this chapter is how 
this right is explicitly upheld when it comes to deciding whether or not to identify an 
individual involved in the criminal justice process. Of course, by explicit or implicit 
design, the reputation and presumption of innocence of these individuals, too, is upheld in 
most news stories on crime. 
  
Norwegian law 
 When it comes to the issue of identification of criminal suspects or arrestees in the 
Norwegian criminal justice system, there are a number of legal protections for these 
individuals, which in turn could be called limits upon the press.  
 According to Section 124 of the Courts of Justice Act, criminal court proceedings 
in Norway are public,375 at which journalists may be present and report. However, prior 
to the initiation of these proceedings, if a journalist reveals the identity of parties 
involved and/or indicted persons, he/she may be held liable via two sorts of actions, 
according to Bygrave and Aarø. First, if the person identified is eventually found 
innocent or if charges against him/her are dropped, he/she can bring an action for 
defamation pursuant to Chapter 23 of the Criminal Penal Code and can demand damages 
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if the information concerned is shown to be false or misleading.376 Second, even if the 
person is convicted, his/her identification prior to the court proceedings may be, at the 
minimum, in breach of Section 390 of the Criminal Penal Code,377 which states, “Any 
person who violates another person’s privacy by giving public information about 
personal or domestic relations shall be liable to fines or imprisonment.”378  
 Section 131(a) of the Courts of Justice Act limits journalists’ actions as well. The 
accused themselves may forbid being photographed or recorded on their way to or from a 
hearing (i.e., perp walk) or during their stay in the building where the hearing is held.379 
Journalists found in breach of these prohibitions will be punished by fines, pursuant to 
Section 198(3) of the Act.380 Another instance, too, in which a journalist is not protected 
in identification is when a person has been reported to the police as a potential suspect; 
however, the Norwegian Supreme Court (Høyesterett) has held that in these instances, 
there might be an exception for serious cases of public interest.381  
 Taken together, what the above pre-criminal court proceeding instances indicate 
is that, in a number of ways, the Norwegian legal system protects explicitly the privacy of 
private citizens suspected and arrested for a crime and their reputation and presumption 
of innocence implicitly; it also gives these individuals viable legal options in case of 
violations. This protection is perhaps more the case now since Norway had incorporated 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1999 with the passage of the 
Human Rights Act,382 which offers explicit protection for privacy, reputation, and 
presumption of innocence as well as freedom of expression, which includes the press.383 
Spielmann states any interference with the operations of the press — for example, 
privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence —“should be provided for by law, 
pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society” and particularly 
relevant in this context is “the pressing social need of the interference and, of course, its 
proportionality.”384 As Tulkens emphasized, “most fundamental rights are not arranged in 
order of priority.”385 
 
Scandinavian press codes of ethics 
 The Norwegian Press Council (Norsk Pressforbund, or NP) is composed of 
private and public media outlets, associations, and unions, which collectively fund the 
council’s operations.386 Membership in NP is voluntary. When it comes to when or 
whether to identify criminal suspects and arrestees in the press, the council has addressed 
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this issue in its code of ethics, which applies to the printed press, radio, television, and 
Internet publications.387 
 In Section 4.7 under the chapter heading of “Publication Rules,” the code states 
that journalists should  
Be cautious in the use of names and photographs and other clear identifiers 
of persons in referring to contentious or punishable matters. Special caution 
should be exercised when reporting cases at the early stage of 
investigation… Identification must be founded on a legitimate need for 
information. It may, for instance, be legitimate to identify someone where 
there is imminent danger of assault or defenceless individuals, in the case 
of serious and repeated crimes, if the identity or social position of the 
subject is patently relevant to the case being reported on, or where 
identification protects the innocent from exposure to unjustified 
suspicion.388  
 
Section 4.12 states, “The use of pictures must comply with the same requirements of 
caution as for a written or oral presentation.”389  
 It is notable that much of what is suggested in these two sections of the code is 
mirrored in the Norwegian law outlined above. In fact, the code’s moments of “serious 
cases of public interest” in Section 4.7 appear to flesh out what the Norwegian Supreme 
Court has suggested may be protected in reporting. Answers provided by editors of 
Norwegian newspapers and an independent consultant (to the Norwegian Institute of 
Journalism; also a former journalist) of press ethics, press law, and transparency in public 
administration in a later section sheds light on “serious cases of public interest” as well. 
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 Norway’s more restricted approach when compared to the U.S. when it comes to 
identification is in line with other Scandinavian countries. Codes of ethics in Denmark 
and Finland draw a much more concrete line when it comes to press identification of 
criminal suspects and arrestees. Sweden’s is remarkably vague by comparison.390 The 
Swedish Code of Ethics’ most direct is Rule 14: “Remember that, in the eyes of the law, 
a person suspected of an offence is always presumed innocent until proven guilty. The 
final outcome of a legal case should be published if it has been previously reported 
on.”391 Other references to naming are general in nature and could apply to anyone in any 
story.  
 Denmark’s Sound Press Ethics is much more specific. Rule 6 under “Court 
reporting” states the following: “To the greatest possible extent, a clear objective line 
shall be followed in deciding which cases are to be covered, and in which instances the 
names of the persons involved are to be given. The name or any other identification of a 
suspect or an accused should be omitted if no public interest calls for the publication of 
the name.”392 Rule 7 under the same category specifically relates to criminal suspects: 
“Caution should be exercised in publishing statements to the effect that information has 
been laid with the police against a person mentioned by name. Such information should 
as a rule not be published until the information laid has resulted in the intervention of the 
police or the prosecution. However, this rule shall not apply to statements referred to by 
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the person informed against, or if the information laid is already widely known or is of 
considerable public interest, or if under the existing circumstances it must be assumed 
that the information laid was well-founded.”393  
 Finland’s Guidelines for Journalists’ Rule 32 under “Private and Public” states 
this: “The journalist must be careful not to present information that may lead to the 
identification of the subject in cases where the subject is only considered a suspect or has 
been charged.”394  
 
Non-legal means of addressing complaints of identification 
 One important component of the Norwegian Press Council is the Norwegian Press 
Complaints Commission (Pressens Faglige Utvalg, or PFU), which meets regularly 
throughout the year to consider complaints from the public against the news media. 
Seven members serve two-year terms: two journalists chosen by the national journalists’ 
union; two editors chosen by the editors’ professional association; and three qualified 
“lay members” from the public. They meet once a month to make rulings, which are all 
based on the Norwegian Code of Ethics.395 
 The complaint-making process is pretty straightforward, but only someone 
directly related to a story in question can complain. The complainant writes to the PFU, 
citing the offending article and explains why he/she thinks it violates the code of ethics. 
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PFU sends the complaint to the editor of the news outlet, who can then either end the 
process by apologizing or continue the complaint process with a defense. If the process 
continues, it goes back to the complainant, who can respond again. Then it goes back to 
PFU. 396 After the commission’s monthly deliberation, if the news outlet has been found 
in breach of the code of ethics, it “must pay penance”397 by publicizing the ruling as soon 
as possible: Newspapers print a small notice, and radio and television broadcasters read a 
short message on air.398 Media members’ signing up for such scrutiny is seen as a kind of 
stamp of accountability by audiences.399 The workings and decisions of PFU are kept 
separate from the judicial system. But, when the complaint appears to involve a legal 
matter, PFU will refer it to the courts. From the perspective of the complainant, it’s often 
preferable to try PFU before hiring a lawyer.400 
 Recent statistics released by PFU indicate that while the number of overall 
complaints against various members of the Norwegian press has risen from 202 in 2000 
to 359 in 2012, the number of breaches of Section 4.7 the press was found to have 
committed has remained, on average, steady at 4.4 over the same time period.401 In 1996, 
it was found that one of the most common complaint categories at PFU was the 
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unnecessary identification of individuals in criminal cases.402 On the press side, it was 
argued that first, these breaches were caused by accident, and second, such breaches were 
not often the case. On this second point, it was stated the breach was a little detail in the 
whole story, and not the whole story itself.403  
 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden all have similar press councils, with a few varying 
details — for example, Denmark’s council was mandated by a law, and Finland’s council 
is partially funded by the Ministry of Justice but with its operations independent of the 
government. But their complaint systems function in largely similar ways as PFU: Any 
member of the public can submit a complaint; administrative fees are paid annually by 
the member organizations. The news outlets voluntarily submit themselves to the 
councils’ judgments because it shows their audiences that they are responsible, 
accountable, and fair.404 How complaints are handled is a bit different, though: Sweden 
has an ombudsman,405 Denmark’s council takes complaints directly (the exception for a 
few broadcasters),406 and Finland’s council takes complaints directly, too, but only on 
matters/stories published by its media members.407 
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Norwegian viewpoints on identification408 
 A 2013 study carried out by the Nordic Media Festival (Nordiskemediedager) 
sought journalists’ and editors’ opinions on issues related to the news media.409 One 
question asked whether it is right to publish the name of a presumed abuser of children 
who is a private citizen. Of the 605 journalists asked, 1% would identify the individual 
when he/she is a suspect, 18% would identify once criminal proceedings have begun, and 
46% would identify upon a conviction. Of the 261 editors who were asked, none would 
identify the suspected individual, 12% would identify once criminal proceedings began, 
and 39% would identify the individual upon conviction. Of note, however, is how 16% of 
journalists and 26% of editors would never identify the individual at all at any point, 
while 15% and 21%, respectively, were not sure.   
 For the purposes of providing further insight into the role identification plays in 
practice, three Norwegian editors from different widely read newspapers and an 
independent consultant to the Norwegian Institute of Journalism (also a former journalist) 
answered a set of five questions for this thesis.410  
 Generally, according to Tor Mørseth, managing editor of Bergens Tidende (BT), 
the paper takes several factors into consideration when discussing identification, he said. 
First, where the story is in the criminal justice system (Normally, BT does not identify 
before conviction unless there are special reasons). Second, the seriousness and nature of 
the crime: In general, the more serious the crime, the more likely BT will identify. 
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Convicted murderers are normally identified; BT also has a lower threshold for 
identifying on economic crimes.411 Third, the need for the public to know the person's 
identity (i.e., known subjects, topics of special interest, situations where there is a risk of 
repeated crime). Last, situations where identification may contribute to new information. 
 Specifically, BT's own code of ethics supplements and “sets stricter standards” to 
Section 4.7 of the Norwegian Press Code of Ethics; it is broken down into eight parts.412  
4.7A. Identification in BT is an active decision. Only members of the 
editorial board (or people appointed by it) can make these decisions.  
 
4.7B. BT will not identify to punish. In some cases, it might be necessary 
to warn the general public against a criminal. One example of this might 
be when an armed and presumed dangerous criminal is being sought.  
 
4.7C. We do not identify people without public interest doing private 
actions. People without public interest may be identified when they do 
public acts. One example might be repeated sexual offences against 
minors, or other very serious crimes. People of public interest doing 
private acts should be identified when the actions are directly connected to 
the person's public position or his/her ability to perform his//her duties. 
When people of public interest do public acts, the main rule is 
identification.  
 
4.7D. We normally identify when a person is indicted, provided the other 
preconditions for identification are met. There are often good reasons to 
omit this rule when there are people of special interest. Normally, a new 
discussion on identification will be held on the different stages of a case 
such as report to the police, suspicion, charge, custody, indictment, 
judgment.  
 
4.7E. The effects on a person's family, and especially children, shall be a 
part of any decision to identify. Consider how the story is presented. How 
we use pictures, titles etc. will be a part of evaluations on whether 
identification is seen [as] relevant information or additional punishment.  
 
4.7F. People who are involved in criminal cases may wish to expose their 
own name. Nevertheless, we have an obligation to consider whether this is 
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proper. Even if a suspect has been identified earlier, for instance as a 
witness, it does not in itself warrant identification.  
 
4.7G. When we do not identify, we should be aware that readers may put 
together different pieces of information and digital clues to reveal the 
person's identity.  
 
4.7H. Even though the police or relatives wish to search for missing or 
wanted persons with name and picture, the editorial office must do an 
independent consideration on whether this is needed. 
 
 In 4.7B, when Mørseth was asked to clarify what "punish" meant, he wrote, 
“Some people will argue that convicted felons should be identified as part of their 
punishment. The identification of a person in media is an added burden, and we have 
taken a stand that we will not identify for this reason.” 
 In 4.7C, he explained the difference between a “private action” and a “public act,” 
which were noted in the first two sentences of the section:  
The distinction between private and public acts is not clear cut. The 
difference could be said to be on whether or not the act affects the general 
public. I will try to explain by giving some examples. Take a politician 
who is exposed of cheating on his/her spouse. This would be considered a 
private act, as it is not [a] violation of the law. In most instances, this will 
not be reported (unless it is believed to affect the person's ability to carry 
out his/her tasks or if it is against what he or she preaches - a politician 
who built his/her career on family values would be identified in such a 
case). 
 
 Lastly, in 4.7D, he elaborated on what is involved in an indictment in Norway: 
In Norway, there are three stages in legal proceedings - suspicion, charge, 
indictment. A person is formally charged with a crime once an arrest or 
any seizures are made - or once it is decided by the prosecutor. It is a 
preliminary indictment against a person who is assumed to have 
committed a crime. The indictment is formally the document presented to 
the court by the prosecutor. The time of the indictment and the actual 
prosecution may differ. Once the indictment is made, it will be sent to the 
court to appoint a time for trial. 
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 The first question posed to the participants was the following: “In general, when a 
crime occurs and a story is published, how do journalists/editors decide if they can or 
cannot identify the presumed offender in a story?”413 
 Mørseth and Morton Abel, an editor at Aftenposten, stated that their respective 
papers’ “starting position” or “general rule” (i.e., default) is not to identify. Jo Randen, 
Dagbladet’s news editor and magazine editor, says the decision has to do with the legal 
situation of the presumed offender; that is, “Is he/she suspected, charged or prosecuted by 
the police?” He said that while press ethics is “not an exact science,” each separate case 
of identification has its own deliberations. Additionally, a person who is prosecuted for a 
crime will more likely be identified than a person who is “just” suspected. Normally, 
according to Gunnar Bodahl-Johansen, the Norwegian Institute of Journalism’s 
independent consultant, a paper does not identify someone until he/she is sentenced to 
incarceration — but the identification in these cases, as they relate to private citizens, 
depends on how seriousness of the crime. Like Randen, he says Norwegian newspapers 
are reluctant to identify people at an early stage in a case, particularly young offenders. 
But the character of the crime will be “decisive” in the decision to identify; even in the 
case of murders, he says, the identity of the individual being published is far from likely. 
There must be a general public interest requirement.  
 Several factors weighing into the decision to identify are concerns about third 
parties in relation to the individual in question (e.g., children, wife or husband, family in 
general, etc.), as well as risk of confusion between two people.   
                                                 
413 “Presumed offender” in these questions refers to private citizens who are either suspected of or arrested 
for a crime. 
 84 
 The second question posed to the four participants was the following: “What are 
examples of when the identity of a presumed offender are published? In these examples, 
why would their identity be published?” 
 Mørseth provided three examples: 
A. We recently published the [identity] of a murderer who stabbed a man 
with a knife 24 times upon conviction.414 We consider murder a public act, 
and it is our position that these acts are a crime against society as a whole. 
There were a number of aggravating details surrounding the case, making it 
one of the more serious murder convictions. We have later been contacted 
by the person's lawyer who [has] threatened to lodge a complaint with the 
press ethics' commission. 
 
B. Another (later convicted murderer) was identified on indictment. This 
was done knowing the indicted had confessed to pulling the trigger. A 
major factor in this story was that the person had threatened and harassed 
the murdered person, his ex-girlfriend, over a long period of time. Violence 
in relationships is a serious issue that has only recently come to people's 
attention. The importance of this issue was a part of our consideration. A 
complaint was lodged with the ethic's commission, with no result.415 
 
C. A person [who] was indicted of 66 incidents of sexual abuse of [minors] 
was identified on the day of the indictment. He had admitted a number of 
the cases, meaning there was no question whether the police had finally 
found the person they had been looking for. The case was perhaps the most 
serious sexual abuse case in Norway to date. Part of the argument to 
identify was that showing this person's name and face could bring new 
cases to the surface. There was also a consideration of warning against a 
man who had a repeated history of sexual offences. The ethics' commission 
found BT's identification just. 
 
 Both Abel and Randen provided more general instances.  
 For the former, the name of the offender must be of public interest — that is, it 
has to be of public interest to know who is the person suspected for the crime. Then the 
crime has to be serious or the offender has misused his position. Much like Mørseth, Abel 
                                                 
414 That is, he was identified at the time of conviction. 
 
415 The complaint commission did not find the newspaper at fault. 
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says the paper won’t identify in an early stage of the investigation unless the offender is 
clearly guilty (i.e., the offender confessed or is taken in flagrancy).  
 At Dagbladet, Randen suggested examples of when the identity is published: 
whether the individual has committed serious crime before, or the individual has a public 
position connected to the crime that makes it relevant to identify, or that not to identify 
may throw suspicion on innocent people. Bodahl-Johansen said that it is difficult to find a 
clear-cut line — but the starting point is that one must be careful to identify; Section 4.7 
is the place to start. Overall, though, he said, for cases involving a decision to identify, 
the crime must be serious, comprehensive, and involve many people. 
 The third question was “What do journalists/editors think about how often they 
identify presumed offenders? Would they like to identify less? More?” 
 Mørseth said that at BT, there is a tendency to identify more than they did a few 
years prior. “It is my experience,” he said, “that reporters are often more eager to identify 
than [an] editor (although that this is not always the case).” He further stated there is 
agreement on the editorial board that there is not a need to identify more or less than what 
they currently do. Abel wrote that journalists often want to identify more in serious cases 
of great public interest (e.g., economic crimes and people behind repeated, organized 
crime). Both of these answers are in keeping with the answer percentages noted above 
(and later below in economic crimes) from Nordiskemediedager’s 2013 study. 
 The fourth question was as follows: “When newspapers decide not to identify a 
presumed offender, why is that? [A]re there other reasons...that keep newspapers from 
identifying presumed offenders?” 
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 Mørseth wrote: 
We believe that people as a general rule have a right to privacy, and as 
such, our starting position is, as mentioned, not to identify. Our ethical 
guidelines reflect this. The possible identification of victims is often part of 
our consideration. This was the reason not to identify in a serious sexual 
abuse case a couple of months back. We believe that we generally have a 
stricter policy on identification than that required by the Norwegian Press 
Code of Ethics. 
 
 For Abel at Aftenposten, Section 4.7 of the Code of Ethics is important because it 
lists criteria for identifying or not, as the Norwegian press is committed to following this 
Code. He went on to elaborate: “We do not identify if the name is of no public interest. A 
reason for not identifying could be to protect the [victims] of the crime.” By identifying 
the offender, he said, there is a risk of also identifying the victim. Another reason for not 
identifying could be to protect the offender’s family, especial children.”416 
 Bodahl-Johansen explained that identification itself highlights both reprehensible 
and criminal offenses. Special account of whether to identify shall be taken at early 
stages of a case, he said, as 1.) there are still many unresolved issues, 2.) to protect young 
people so that they hopefully can live normally later in life, and 3.) in those cases where 
the identification of the perpetrator can be very stressful for his/her family, especially the 
kids. 
 He also said that identification must be justified by a “legitimate need for 
information.” That is, it must be important for the public to know whom the perpetrator 
or alleged perpetrator is. Examples he provided include: when there is danger of abuse 
against defenseless people; the serious and repeated criminal acts; when there is a clear 
connection between the person’s social role and action to prevent innocent people being 
                                                 
416 This latter point is stressed in BT’s own code of ethics (4.7E), as well as in Randen’s and Bodahl-
Johansen’s own answers on the subject. 
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subjected to unwarranted suspicion. Insecurity that follows in the wake of serious crimes 
can also legitimize the identification of the perpetrator. Finally, although the police may 
request that pictures be posted of any elusive criminals, the press, he said, has an 
independent ethical responsibility and may not follow suit. 
 Randen of Dagbladet also stressed the major role the section plays in the paper’s 
decisionmaking. He did note, though, that he didn’t think the fear of getting sued plays a 
large part on whether to identify or not. 
 This last point brings up the final question: “How often do newspapers get sued 
because their story identified a presumed offender?” 
 Mørseth said that it is not common for newspapers to be sued in Norway, and 
cases where they are sued specifically for identification are rare. “In one recent court 
ruling,” he said, “a newspaper was found guilty not of identification as such, but of 
defamation (which of course may not have been the case if the person had not been 
identified).” The risks of BT being sued has not been a part of the paper’s considerations 
of identification issues for at least the past 2.5 years he has been on the editorial board. 
Complaints to PFU are, however, quite common in identification. Aftenposten, according 
to Abel, has not been sued for identification; if it does occur anywhere, he said, it is rare. 
Like Mørseth, he said there have been some complaints to PFU. Randen of Dagbladet 
was not aware of any mass medium in Norway that was sued because their story 
identified a presumed offender; but, he concedes it may have happened outside of his 
personal knowledge. What he is aware of, though, is that Norwegian media have been 
sued writing incorrectly about an identified person and, in that way, have harmed the 
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person’s reputation. Bodahl-Johansen said that identification of criminals is not so much 
a legal question as it is a press ethics one. 
 One type of crime — economic crimes — seems to have much more relaxed 
identification standards than other types of crime. When asked to elaborate on why BT 
has a lower threshold for these cases, Mørseth says it has been a tradition in Norwegian 
media for some time. One reason is that there has traditionally been less shame connected 
with economic crimes. Randen said this greater inclination to identify in these cases may 
be that the Norwegian press recognizes that the presumed offenders often have important 
positions in society, so that they have taken more rational choices, and have the 
possibility not to swindle, cheat taxes, etc.417 
 
Further examples of how the Norwegian press handle identification 
 Bodahl-Johansen offered a detailed example of a case of identification from 1995 
— one, he said, that caused a story both inside and outside of the press.418 
 On Friday, April 28, 1995, a 37-year-old woman was arrested by the police in 
Bergen. She was suspected of having killed 10 people at the nursing-home where she 
worked. When the woman was arrested, the police didn’t have any conclusive proof, but 
they told the press that the following Tuesday the police would ask the court to imprison 
the woman based on circumstantial evidence. BT, he said, knew the case very well and 
was prepared to run the story: The newspaper had taken photos of the woman in a 
shopping center with a hidden camera, and the editorial staff had reached the conclusion 
                                                 
417 Emphasis added. See also Nordiskemediedager, “Media Examination 2013.” 
 
418 For other examples, generally, see Røssland, “Pressa Si Indentifisering.” 
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that they would use the name and the picture of the woman at the moment she was 
arrested. 
 The publisher of BT, he said, is one of the leading publishers and editors in 
Norway. He is 43-year-old star who has been leader of the Editors Association for many 
years. He had been the editor-in-chief in a highly respected religious newspaper, and, 
after that, the managing editor and EIC of the Norwegian National News Service.  
 The same day the woman was arrested in Bergen, Bodahl-Johansen said, the 
Editors Association happened to have its annual meeting in Oslo. When BT’s publisher 
got the message from his staff that the woman was arrested, he asked for a meeting with 
several distinguished editors at the meeting, all of whom were his confidantes. Among 
them was the secretary general of the Norwegian Press Council (Norsk Pressforbund, or 
NP), who is in charge of the Norwegian Press Complaints Commission (Pressens Faglige 
Utvalg, or PFU). Based on their advice, the publisher drew the conclusion that BT should 
use both the name and the pictures of the woman — a message he sent home to his staff. 
 The next day, on April 29, BT ran a blown up article on the front page with a 
follow-up on pages 2 and 3. But that day, Bodahl-Johansen said, the publisher got a big 
surprise: No other newspapers, TV-stations or radio-stations in Norway named the 
woman — not even the Norwegian tabloids (except the commercial TV-station, TV2, 
which also has its headquarters in Bergen). The case was, of course, the leading story in 
all the media, though — but without the name and the picture of the woman. 
Instantly, he said, BT’s and TV2’s conduct became the hot story. Had the newspaper and 
the TV-station broken the Code of Ethics when they named the woman and used the 
pictures that were taken by hidden cameras? 
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 BT defended its conduct with the following: First, the case was very serious — it 
includes the murder of 10 people, maybe more. Second, to avoid throwing unjustified 
suspicion on the woman’s nursing home colleagues, it was necessary to name the woman. 
 TV2, he said, used the same argument. But in addition, the TV-station said 
naming the woman gave the staff a special responsibility to follow up the story by 
looking very closely after the police investigation. The secretary general of the PFU, too, 
defended BT’s conduct in the public debate that was “very hot” that Saturday and 
Sunday. 
 On Monday, May 1, the publisher of BT changed his mind and decided to print an 
apology for naming the woman and using the pictures. In a very personal written letter, 
which was placed at the front page, the publisher stated the basic principle in press ethics 
is to avoid using a name in court and crime reporting, and that BT should have followed 
this basic principle. The Secretary General of PFU told the press that he, too, had 
changed his mind. TV2, however, would not excuse its actions to identify.  
 In the meantime, the criminal investigation brought the police to the conclusion 
that it did not have enough proof to bring a charge against the woman. Therefore, they 
had to let the woman go.  
 Of course, in this example, the 10,000 kroner-question was if it was right or 
wrong to name the woman and publish the pictures — and if it was acceptable to take 
pictures by a hidden camera. 
 Another prominent example of identification, one related to murder, occurred 
several years ago. In the autumn of 2009, a 15-year-old girl, Oda Moe, was found dead, 
and an 18-year-old male was arrested. A couple of days later, a national Norwegian 
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newspaper, Dagbladet, published the name and photo of the arrestee, the image of which 
was taken from his Facebook page. No other paper released his identifying information. 
In the days following, criticism by various newspapers as well as PFU and academics 
was directed at Dagbladet for releasing this information.  
 Dagbladet’s ethics editor (etikkredaktør) at the time, Lars Helle, had said the 
paper made a concrete assessment of the case before it chose to identify the 18-year-old: 
“Each such case is considered special. Then, we take into account unique factors. It was, 
first and foremost, this case’s grave character and that there was talk about an adult male 
who did it that we choose to identify in this case.” He said the individual been a minor, 
the paper would have chosen not to identify him.419 Dagbladet’s decision, he said, was 
within the rules of the Norwegian Press Code of Ethics, saying “We are talking about a 
person who was of age.”420 Additionally, he did not take the newspaper’s identifying as a 
sign that the paper had stepped over the line: “I see it as a healthy sign. It shows that it is 
an independent editorial decision for all the editors.”421  
 Per Anders Madsen of Aftenposten sarcastically said, “A thorough assessment lay 
behind Dagbladet's identification of the accused murderer in Skaun. Even worse.”422 
PFU’s former general secretary, Per Edgar Kokkvold, said had he been an editor, he 
would not have identified the individual, citing Section 4.7 of the Norwegian Press Code 
                                                 
419  Helge Wekre, “Dagbladet Identifiserer Drapssiktet 18-åring: Alene om å Identifisere den Drapsiktede i 
Skaun-saken,” Nettavisen.no, November 3, 2009, accessed July 24, 2013, 
http://www.na24.no/propaganda/article2748024.ece. 
 
420 Jørn Pettersen and Tor-Hartvig Bondø, “Dagbladet kan bli Politianmeldt for Bildetyveri: Får Kritikk 
Etter Identifisering av Drapsiktet,” VG.no, November 4, 2009, accessed July 24, 2013, 
https://www.vg.no/rampelys/artikkel.php?artid=582641. 
 
421 Wekre, “Dagbladet Identifiserer Drapssiktet 18-åring.” 
 
422 Helge Øgrim, “Skaun-kronologi: Dette Skjedde, Dag for Dag,” Journalisten.no, November 20, 2009, 
accessed July 24, 2013, http://www.journalisten.no/story/59534. 
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as why, because there was not a “legitimate reason” to depict the individual.423 “This,” he 
said, “is certainly not in keeping with good press ethics.”424 Even if the Code of Ethics at 
this point allows for a discretionary assessment, he said, “I cannot understand that 
Dagbladet’s decision is right.”425 Bodahl-Johansen said it was completely unnecessary to 
identify, adding “There was not found any basis in order to do so.” Bjarne Kvam from 
Bergen’s Faculty of Law, who is a researcher and former journalist, said, “It’s sad, and it 
is a recurring problem that Norwegian editors cannot take sensible choices in connection 
with identification. In this case, as traditional murder cases, there is no reason to do 
so.”426 Verdens Gang (VG, also a national newspaper) editor Bernt Olufsen said that 
while it is up to every newsroom to consider each case based on the information 
available, it was “our firm opinion that it would be contrary to the Code of Ethics to 
identify the concerned person now.”427 
                                                 
423 Wekre, “Dagbladet Identifiserer Drapssiktet 18-åring.” 
 
424 Pettersen and Bondø, “Dagbladet kan bli Politianmeldt for Bildetyveri.” 
 
425 Ibid. 
 
426 Ibid. 
 
427 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SOLUTIONS 
 
“We cannot make good news out of bad practice.” 
— Edward R. Murrow 
 
 There is a need to do something to in the United States to better protect the 
privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence of private individuals suspected of or 
arrested for a crime from being identified by name and/or photo in the media 
The way that Norwegian news media decides to identify these individuals — based solely 
on ethical and not legal considerations — demonstrates that alternatives exist among 
viable press systems. The point of explaining how their legal system, press council, and 
press code of ethics works in these matters, however, was to show how important the 
principles of privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence are to a society and what 
they do to maintain them. That this one small Western country has accomplished this 
goal for its citizens sets the bar as to what can be accomplished if the press and society 
set their minds to it.  
 As outlined in the thesis, all four principles — privacy, reputation, presumption of 
innocence, and the public’s right to know — are vital in American society. But with 
regard to the former three, both the law and the press over the years have inadequately or 
have not preserved them when it comes to the identification of private citizens suspected 
of or arrested for a crime. For example, in the criminal justice system, the principle of 
presumption of innocence has been legally retracted so considerably from what it once 
was — yet, that doesn’t mean the press can’t do anything when it comes to its own code 
of ethics, much like the Norwegians have done. If the government doesn’t do anything to 
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protect the privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence of individuals, the press, 
then, should step up and do what it can. 
 What is needed are ways to limit the identification of suspects or arrestees in news 
stories to begin with, such that privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence are 
preserved — but doing so without trampling on the press and the public’s right to know 
what happens when crimes occur. So, what can be done now, both legislatively and in 
practice, to preserve, uphold, and maintain them? What balance can be found? 
 
Remedies involving the law  
 While it is true the press voluntarily withholds the names of certain individuals 
involved in the criminal justice process “whose privacy it deems worthy of protecting” 
(e.g., victims of sexual assault and juvenile offenders), this protection is discretionary — 
that is, it only supplements existing statutory protections.428  
 As noted in Chapter V, in a number of instances, statutes have been created in 
order to preserve, explicitly, privacy and, implicitly, reputation and presumption of 
innocence of private citizens caught up in other parts of the criminal justice process 
without unduly and, more importantly, unconstitutionally restricting the press. The 
statutes themselves have used the privacy interests developed by the common law: “the 
interest in preventing the dissemination of personal information, enshrined in the 
common-law tort of public disclosure of private facts.” The factual premise of this right 
is that being publically identified at various stages in the criminal justice process causes a 
“plethora of harms,” and that these harms are difficult to justify when they are visited 
                                                 
428 Reza, “Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect,” 866 (see Chap. I, n. 3). 
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upon those who are, for example, suspected or against whom charges are not even 
pursued.429  
 But, victims of sexual assault and juvenile offenders are not the only instances in 
which statutes — at both the state and federal level and constitutionally supported when 
legally challenged — have limited the press’s access to individuals’ identities at various 
instances of the criminal justice process by directing the government to withhold names, 
the withholding of which a number of scholars throughout the decades have supported.430  
 Of course, a new statute supporting this government action of withholding names 
would make it more difficult for the press to find out information on criminal suspects 
and arrestees — much as it has already done with statutes currently in place for other 
individuals within the criminal justice process. But difficulty getting identifying 
information wouldn’t necessarily be a bad thing, Reza notes.431 First, it would require the 
press to make a true newsworthiness decision, or at least a more refined one, in order to 
decide whether to devote time and resources to finding out the identity of a suspect or 
arrestee. Second, the government’s practice of not naming these individuals would 
encourage the press to voluntarily mirror itself on the statute (i.e., establish codes of 
ethics), much as it has done with regard to victims of sexual assault and juvenile 
offenders. Third, by mirroring itself, the press would show its readers that it is not 
                                                 
429 Ibid., 765. 
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431 Reza, “Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect,” 868-869 (see Chap. I, n. 3). 
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indifferent to public understanding of privacy, reputation, and presumption of innocence 
and governmental protections in place to keep names under wraps.432  
  
Remedies involving the press 
 Most ethics guidelines are just that — guidelines.433 Many questions of media 
responsibility are addressed in the codes of professional media ethics and practice 
voluntarily adopted by journalists.434 They attempt to help journalists make better 
decisions. They also increase accountability to and earn the trust of readers by helping to 
explain editorial choices, linking them to articulated principles of good practice. They 
provide moral justification for controversial coverage.435 Many of these codes do 
implicitly or explicitly accept certain wide responsibilities to society, but they rarely 
involve any — if at all — firm obligations of a proactive or enforceable kind.436 While no 
code can anticipate every dilemma or resolve every question, the attempt is made 
nonetheless to address the majority of controversies.437  
 Without relying on the law but instead on ethic principles outlined in this thesis, 
one option individual newspapers or the Society of Professional Journalists can take upon 
themselves, which is perhaps the simplest solution of all, is amend existing ethical 
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guidelines. That is, withhold in most cases the names and/or photos of private individuals 
suspected of or arrested for a crime until trial proceedings begin. The Norwegian 
handling of identification is instructive. Most striking was how the privacy of the 
individual in the criminal justice process was used as the default starting position, and 
how various factors had to be weighed in order to justify identification — factors that are 
readily articulated. Following the Norwegian example of limiting identification, a new 
roadmap of press ethics could be fashioned in American newsrooms that strike a better 
balance between disclosure and privacy. 
 Until change happens on a large scale, though, I would urge newsrooms skeptical 
of the ideas presented in this thesis to at least try this practice for a short duration (e.g., a 
week, a month, several months) and have newsroom discussions throughout the allotted 
timeframe to consider how various members feel and think about the practice. The 
change has to start somewhere. As of now, newsrooms are already split on when or if 
they name suspects at all (see Chapter III). The American press should take the next step 
— the groundwork of which has been laid out by the Norwegian participants. 
 Another option, which is on a much larger scale and requires a high level of trust 
and cooperation among newsrooms, is to use a press council, which, as previously 
discussed in Chapter VIII, researches and reports on complaints against news outlets and 
facilitates forums for discussion of press performance. Norwegians in this regard must be 
doing something right, as the vast majority of complaints on identification are run 
through their complaints commission and so rarely are newspapers sued. 
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 Press councils are not new to the United States; they just haven’t flourished.438 
However, a press council would probably not be possible on a national level, as there are 
simply too many news organizations in the United States; also, the attempt was made in 
the 1970s but was resisted by the larger newspapers (e.g., The New York Times and The 
Washington Post), floundered for about 10 years, and finally died in the 1980s.439 Today, 
only one active press council  — the Washington Press Council — exists in the United 
States.  
 There are several points any new or existing press council would need to different 
to successfully thrive. First, a specific press code of ethics for a state needs to be formed 
by the council that provides clear guidelines for the newsrooms to follow, even if it 
differs from other state’s or the SPJ Code of Ethics (e.g., withholding from publication 
the names and/or photos of criminal suspects and arrestees before trial proceedings, 
exceptions being noted).  Second, the news organizations themselves within each state 
must collectively be members, all of which would be subject to the council’s non-legally 
binding evaluation and “punishment” of having to print or broadcast the findings against 
them. Third, as collective members, each should contribute funds to the council for 
operating costs so the council would not be dependent on outside funding, which may be 
seen as a conflict of interest. Last, the members of the council and complaint commission 
should be a mix of journalists and editors from member news organizations as well as 
qualified citizens of the public (e.g., professors of press ethics) . 
                                                 
438 Bobby Carmichael, “News Councils Revisited,” American Journalism Review October/November 2006, 
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 The legal and non-legal solutions suggested are based on the belief that such 
principles as privacy, reputation, and the presumption of innocence are justifiable ends to 
strive for and support when it comes to identification of private citizens who are 
suspected or arrested for a crime — while at the same time preserving the press’ support 
for the public’s right to know of criminal justice proceedings.  
 Norwegian laws and press practices have been a revealing lens for this issue. This 
information provides an outside-the-box framework for appraising when a newspaper 
should identify a criminal suspect or arrestee. No doubt criticism for trying something 
new will come. But the evidence provided in this thesis shows that the press can achieve 
a better balance between privacy and disclosure when determining whether to identify 
private individuals caught up in the criminal justice system 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONS POSED TO NORWEGIAN PARTICIPANTS 
 
“Presumed offenders” in these questions refers to private citizens who are either 
suspected of or arrested for a crime: 
 
1. In general, when a crime occurs and a story is published, how do journalists/editors 
decide if they can or cannot identify the presumed offender in a story? 
  
2. What are examples of when the identity of a presumed offender are published? In these 
examples, why would their identity be published? 
  
3. What do journalists/editors think about how often they identify presumed offenders? 
Would they like to identify less? More? 
  
4. When newspapers decide not to identify a presumed offender, why is that? I 
understand Section 4.7 of the Norwegian Press Code of Ethics plays a large part, but are 
there other reasons (f.eks., afraid of being sued, protecting privacy, etc.) that keep 
newspapers from identifying presumed offenders? 
  
5. How often do newspapers get sued because their story identified a presumed offender? 
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APPENDIX B 
EMAIL RESPONSE FROM TOR MØRSETH, BERGENS TIDENDE 
 
Jonathan, 
   
At Bergens Tidende, we have our own code of ethics, that comas as an addition to the so-
called VVP. This code elaborates on the Norwegian Press Code of Ethics and sets stricter 
standards on a number of issues. I've made a rough translation for you below: 
 
4.7A Identification in BT is an active decision. Only members of the editorial board (or 
people appointed by it) can make these decisions. 
 
4.7B BT will not identify to punish. In some cases, it might be necessary to warn the 
general public against a criminal. One example of this might be when an armed and 
presumed dangerous criminal is being sought. 
 
4.7C We do not identify people without public interest doing private actions. People 
without public interest may be identified when they do public acts. One example might 
be repeated sexual offences against minors, or other very serious crimes. People of public 
interest doing private acts should be identified when the actions are directly connected to 
the person's public position or his/her ability to perform his//her duties. When people of 
public interest do public acts, the main rule is identification. 
 
4.7D We normally identify when a person is indicted, provided the other preconditions 
for identification are met. There are often good reasons to omit this rule when there are 
people of special interest. Normally, a new discussion on identification will be held on 
the different stages of a case - such as report to the police, suspicion, charge, custody, 
indictment, judgement. 
 
4.7E The effects on a person's family, and especially children, shall be a part of any 
decision to identify. Consider how the story is presented. How we use pictures, titles etc. 
will be a part of evelations on whether identification is seen a relevant information or 
additional punishment. 
 
4.7F People who are involved in criminal cases may wish to expose their own name. 
Nevertheless, we have an obligation to consider whether this is proper. Even if a suspect 
has been identified earlier, for instance as a witness, it does not in itself warrant 
identification. 
 
4.7G When we do not identify, we should be aware that readers may put together 
different pieces of information and digital clues to reveal the person's identity. 
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4.7H Even though the police or relatives wish to search for missing or wanted persons 
with name and picture, the editorial office must do an independent consideration on 
whether this is needed. 
 
 
As I said, this is a very rough translation, but let me know if something is unclear. 
In general, these are the factors we consider when discussing identification: 
* Where the story is in the criminal system (normally, we do not identify before 
conviction unless there are special reasons) 
* The seriousness and nature of the crime (in general, the more serious the crime, the 
more likely we will identify. Convicted murderers are normally identified. We have also 
had a lower threshold for identifying on economic crime) 
* The need for the public to know the person's identity (known subjects, topics of special 
interest, situations where there is a risk of repeated crime) 
* Situations where identification may contribute to new information 
 
1. As stated in our code of ethics, we will always make an active decision to identify 
before doing so. Our starting position is always not to identify. Normally, I will have a 
sit-down with reporters and the relevant news manager to go through the reasons not to 
identify and the reasons to do so. These incidents are run through me to make sure we 
have a uniform policy. 
 
2. We recently published the identify of a murderer who stabbed a man with a knife 24 
times upon conviction. We consider murder a public act, and it is our position that these 
acts are a crime against society as a whole. There were a number of aggravating details 
surrounding the case, making it one of the more serious murder convictions. We have 
later been contacted by the person's lawyer who have threatened to lodge a complaint 
with the press ethics' commission. 
 
Another (later convicted murderer) was identified on indictment. This was done knowing 
the indicted had confessed to pulling the trigger. A major factor in this story was that the 
person had threatened and harassed the murdered person, his ex-girlfriend, over a long 
period of time. Violence in relationships is a serious issue that has only recently come to 
people's attention. The importance of this issue was a part of our consideration. A 
complaint was lodged with the ethic's commission, with no result. 
 
A person that was indicted of 66 incidents of sexual abuse of murders (correction: 
minors) was identified on the day of the indictment. He had admitted a number of the 
cases, meaning there was no question whether the police had finally found the person 
they had been looking for. The case was perhaps the most serious sexual abuse case in 
Norway to date. Part of the argument to identify was that showing this person's name and 
face could bring new cases to the surface. There was also a consideration of warning 
against a man who had a repeated history of sexual offences. The ethics' commission 
found BT's identification just. 
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3. At BT, there is a tendency to identify more than we did a few years back. It is my 
experience that reporters are often more eager to identify than editor (although that is not 
always the case). There is agreement on the editorial board on today's guidelines. 
 
4. We believe that people as a general rule have a right to privacy, and as such our 
starting position is, as mentioned, not to identify. Our ethical guidelines reflect this. The 
possible identification of victims is often part of our consideration. This was the reason 
not to identify in a serious sexual abuse case a couple of months back. We believe that we 
generally have a stricter policy on identification than that required by the Norwegian 
Press Code of Ethics. 
 
5. It is not common to sue newspapers in Norway, and cases where newspapers are sued 
for identification are a rarity. In one recent court ruling, a newspaper was found guilty not 
of identification as such, but of defamation (which of course may not have been the case 
if the person had not been identified). Complaints to the ethic's commission are however 
quite common on identification. Risks of being sued has not been a part of our 
consideration in these issues in my time on the editorial board (the last 2,5 years). 
 
Hope this answers your questions. If anything is unclear or you need me to elaborate on 
something, please let me know. 
 
 
Best regards, 
 
Tor Olav Mørseth  
Managing Editor 
Mediehuset Bergens Tidende  
 
 
TOR’S FOLLOW-UP ANSWERS TO MY QUESTIONS 
 
1. In 4.7B, it states that "BT will not identify to punish." What do you mean by "punish"? 
 
— Some people will argue that convicted felons should be identified as part of their 
punishment. The identification of a person in media is an added burden, and we have 
taken a stand that we will not identify for this reason. Was that clearer?   
 
2. In 4.7C, what is the difference between a "private action" and a "public act" (from the 
first two sentences)? 
 
— The distinction between private and public acts is not clear cut. The difference could 
be said to be on whether or not the act affects the general public. I will try to explain by 
giving some examples. Take a politician who is exposed of cheating on his/her spouse. 
This would be considered a private act, as it is not an violation of the law. In most 
instances, this will not be reported (unless it is believed to affect the person's ability to 
 104 
carry out his/her tasks or if it is against what he or she preaches - a politician who built 
his/her career on family values would be identified in such a case). 
 
3. In 4.7D, would you be able to explain what is involved in an indictment in Norway? I 
notice it follows custody and charges; is "indictment" the point in court proceedings 
where the prosecution begins? I guess a better way of putting it is this: Does indictment 
happen at the same time as prosecution in Norway? In the U.S., an indictment and the 
actual prosecution happen separately. 
 
— Unfortunately, I am not familiar in detail with the American justice system. In 
Norway, there are three stages in legal proceedings - suspicion, charge, indictment. A 
person is formally charged with a crime once an arrest or any seizures are made - or once 
it is decided by the prosecutor. It is a preliminary indictment against a person who is 
assumed to have committed a crime. The indictment is formally the document presented 
to the court by the prosecutor. The time of the indictment and the actual prosecution may 
differ. Once the indictment is made, it will be sent to the court to appoint a time for trial. 
 
4. When you say that BT has a lower threshold for identifying on economic crime, why is 
that? What is special about economic crimes? 
 
— This has been a tradition in Norwegian media for some time. One of the reasons is that 
there has traditionally been less shame connected with economic crime. 
 
5. In Answer #2, in the 1st example (stabbed a man 24 times), just so I 
 
— Yes, he was identified at the time of conviction. 
 
6. In Answer #2, in the 3rd example, how many people did the person murder? 
 
— This person did not murder a single person. 
 
7. In Answer #3, when you write that "There is agreement on the editorial board on 
today's guidelines," what do you mean by this? 
 
— By this, I mean that we don't see a need to identify more or less than we currently do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105 
APPENDIX C 
EMAIL RESPONSE FROM MORTON ABEL, AFTENPOSTEN 
 1.       The general rule is not to identify. A decision  to identify must be based on the 
criteria in art.  4.7 in the Norwegian Press Code of Ethics. 
 2.       First of all, the name of the offender must be of public interest, i.e. it has to be of 
public interest to know who is the person suspected for the crime.  Then the crime has to 
be serious or the offender has misused his position.  We do not identify on an early stage 
of the investigation, unless the offender is obvious guilty.  We generally do not identify 
before there exist a court decision of detention in custody.  
 3.       Journalists often want to identify more in serious cases of great public interest, e.g. 
economic crimes, and people behind repeated, organized crimes. 
 4.       Art. 4.7 in the Code of Ethics is important.  We do not identify if the name is of no 
public interest.  A reason for not identifying could be to protect the offers of the crime, by 
identifying the offender it can be a risk of also identify the offer. Another reason for not 
identifying could be to protect the offenders family, especial children. 
 5.       It is rare.  Aftenposten has not been sued for identifying, but we have had some 
complaints to The Norwegian press compliant commission. 
Regards, 
Morten Abel 
Redaktør 
 
MORTEN’S FOLLOW-UP ANSWERS TO MY QUESTIONS 
 
1. In Answer #2, you wrote that "We do not identify on an early stage of the 
investigation, unless the offender is obvious guilty." How does the paper decide this? Do 
you decided if they are guilty? Is it something the offender does, says, etc?   
 
— The offender confess or is taken inflagrancy 
 
2. Also in Answer #2, could you explain what "a court decision of detention of custody" 
is? I am not familiar with this phrase.   
 
— I mean the first decision in a court. 
 
3. In Answer #4, you say Article 4.7 of the Code of Ethics is important.  Can you 
explain/elaborate why it is important?   
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— Art, 4.7 is important because it lists criteria for identification/not identification.  The 
Norwegian press has committed itselv to follow The Code of Ethics. 
 
4. Also in Answer #4, in this sentence: "A reason for not identifying could be to protect 
the offers of the crime, by identifying the offender it can be a risk of also identify the 
offer." What do you mean by the word "offer" used twice in this sentence?  
 
— I mean victim. 
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APPENDIX D 
EMAIL RESPONSE FROM JO RANDEN, DAGBLADET 
 
Hi Jonathan, 
  
I’ve tried to answer your questions as far as I can.  Press ethics is not an exact science, we 
make our deliberations in each separate case. And the deliberations may differ from 
person to person.  But after a discussion with another editor who have long experience 
with journalism on crime, I think this answer is quite adequate for our view. 
  
 1.       In general, Norwegian press rarely identify presumed offenders in a story.  When a 
crime occur and a story is published, the Norwegian Press Code of Ethics (especially  
section 4,7) play a major role when journalist/editors decide if they can or cannot 
identify.   
 
The decision to identify or not has also to do with the legal situation of the presumed 
offender. Is he/she suspected, charged of prosecuted by the police?  A person that is 
prosecuted for a crime will easier be identified than a person that is “just” suspected. 
Concerns about the third part (e.g. children, wife or husband, family in general, etc.) may 
also play an important role. 
 
You will also see that the press is more inclined to identify presumed offenders  in stories 
that  concern economical crime than violent crime. The reason may be that the press 
recognize that the presumed offenders in economic crime often have important positions 
in the society, they have taken more rational choices, they have had the possibility not to 
swindle, cheat taxes, etc. 
  
 2.       Examples of when the identity of a presumed offender are published may be when 
the presumed offender has done serious crime before, or the presumed offender has a 
public position connected to the crime that make it relevant to identify (a chief 
commander in the police is more likely to be identified as presumed offender in violent 
crime than an unknown carpenter or cashier), or that not to identify may throw suspicion 
on innocent people, etc. 
  
 3.       It’s difficult to me to answer whether other journalists/editors would like to identify 
less or more. 
  
 4.       In general I think Norwegian Press Code of Ethics  play a major role when 
editors/journalist decide to identify or not.  I don’t think the fear to get sued play a large 
part. 
  
 5.       I’m not aware of any mass media in Norway that is sued mainly because their story 
identified a presumed offenders.   But of course that may have happened. What I’m 
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aware of is that Norwegian medias have been sued to write incorrectly about an identified 
person and in that way have harmed the persons reputation.  
  
  
Kindly regards 
Jo 
  
Med vennlig hilsen 
 Jo Randen 
Magasinredaktør og nyhetsredaktør (kst.) 
Dagbladet 
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APPENDIX E 
EMAIL RESPONSE FROM GUNNAR BODAHL-JOHANSEN, INSTITUTT FOR 
JOURNALISTIKK (INSTITUTE OF JOURNALISM) 
  
 1. The answer depends on whom it applies to. If a politician is reported to the police, it 
may be a news story in itself. Normally, one does not identify someone before they are 
prepared for incarceration. But it must either involve a prominent person or the crime. is 
serious. If people abuse the public’s trust, it may in itself be an argument to identify. But 
generally, Norwegian newspapers are reluctant to identify people at an early stage in the 
case, and particularly young offenders. Risk of confusion between two people, may also 
be a reason to identify. But again, the crime character will be decisive. It's far from all 
murders are identified. A basic requirement is that the information about who the 
perpetrator is, must have a general interest 
2. There is considerable uncertainty associated with the identification. It is also difficult 
to find a clear-cut line. The starting point is that one must be careful to identify, see the 
Code of Ethics. The crime must be serious, comprehensive and involve many people. In 
most newsrooms editors are struggling to make a right decision.  
 3. [No answer provided.] 
4. Identification highlight both reprehensible and criminal offenses. It is not only the 
name and image that identifies a person, but also a number of other details. A special 
account shall be taken at an early stage of the case as there are still many unresolved 
issues, to protect young people so that they hopefully can live normally later in life, in 
those cases where the identification of the perpetrator can be very stressful for the family, 
especially for the kids. The identification must be justified by a "legitimate need for 
information", that means it must be important for the public to know who the perpetrator 
or alleged perpetrator is, for example, when there is danger of abuse against defenseless 
people, the serious and repeated criminal acts, when there is a clear connection between 
the person's social role and action to prevent innocent people being subjected to 
unwarranted suspicion. Insecurity that follows in the wake of serious crimes can also 
legitimize the identification of the perpetrator. Although police requests to post pictures 
of runaway criminals, the press has an independent press ethical responsibility. 
 
5. Normally, the identification be subject to legal action, because mention of criminal 
cases of public ineteresse and protected by free speech according to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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GUNNARS’S FOLLOW-UP ANSWER TO MY QUESTION 
 
One question, though: Would you be able to clarify your Answer #5 []? I don't quite 
understand it. 
 
Identfying crminals is not a legal question but a press ethical question.  
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY GUNNAR 
 
I. The use of name and pictures in court and crime reporting 
In connection with a book I am writing about the PCC, I have studied all the cases which 
the PCC has dealt with from 1936 to 1994. From that study I can see that no questions 
has risen more conflicts than the use of name and picture in court and crime reporting. 
Recently we had two very hot cases which stirred storm both inside and outside the press. 
And once more the politicians asked for law-regulations. In the following I will deal with 
one of them, a case from one of the biggest Norwegian dailies, Bergens Tidende, in 
Bergen at the west coast of Norway. 
 
Friday 28. April 1995 a 37-years old woman was arrested by the police in Bergen 
suspected of having killed 10 persons at the nursing-home where she worked. When she 
was arrested, the police didn’t had any conclusive proof, but the police told the press that 
it the following Tuesday would ask the court to prison the woman based on several 
circumstantial evidences. 
 
Bergens Tidende knew the case very well, and had prepared everything. The newspaper 
had taken photos of the woman in a shopping centre with a hidden camera, and the 
editorial staff had - as far as I am told - discussed the matter and reached the conclusion 
that they would use the name and the picture of the woman at the moment she was 
arrested. 
 
The publisher of Bergens Tidende is one of the leading publishers and editors in Norway. 
A 43-years old star who has been leader of the Editors Association for many years. He 
had been the editor-in-chief in a highly respected religious newspaper and after that the 
editor-in-chief and managing editor of the Norwegian National News Service.  
 
Friday 28. April - the same day as the woman was arrested - the Editors Association 
happened to have their annual meeting in Oslo. When the publisher of Bergens Tidende 
got the message from his staff that the woman was arrested, he asked for a meeting with 
several distinguished editors who all of them were his confidantes. Among them the 
Secretary general of the Norwegian Press Association who is in charge of the PCC. 
Based on their advice the publisher draw the conclusion that Bergens Tidende should use 
both the name and the pictures of the woman - a message he sent home to his staff. 
 
Here is the result in the newspaper Saturday 29. April:  
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A blown up article at the front page with a follow-up at page 2 and 3. But that day the 
publisher got a big surprise: No other newspapers, TV-stations or radio-stations in 
Norway named the woman - not even the Norwegians tabloids - expect from the 
commercial TV-station TV 2 which also has its headquarters in Bergen. The case was of 
course the leading story in all media, but without the name and the picture of the woman. 
Momentary Bergens Tidende’s and TV 2’s conduct became the hot story. Had the 
newspaper and the TV-station broken the Code of Ethics when they named the woman 
and used the pictures which were taken by hidden cameras? 
 
Bergens Tidende’s defended its conduct as following: 
1. The case is very seriously - it includes murder of 10 persons - may be more.  
 
2. To avoid throwing unjustified suspicion on the woman’s colleagues, it was necessary 
to name the woman. 
 
TV 2 used the same argumentation, but in addition the TV-station said that naming the 
woman gave the staff a special responsibility to follow up the story by looking very 
closely after the police investigation.  
The Secretary general of the PCC stood also behind this argumentation and defended 
Bergens Tidende’s conduct in the public debate which was very hot both Saturday and 
Sunday. 
 
Monday changed the publisher of Bergens Tidende his mind and decided to print an 
excuse for naming the woman and using the pictures. In a very personal written excuse, 
which was placed at the front page, the publisher states that the basic principle (in the 
press ethics) is to avoid using name in court and crime reporting, and that Bergens 
Tidende should have followed this basic principle. 
 
The Secretary general of The PCC told the press that he also had changed his mind. 
 
But TV 2 would not excuse anything.  
 
The case is brought before the Press Complaint Commission, but it is still not 
adjudicated.  
 
In meantime the criminal investigation has brought the police to the conclusion that it 
does not has enough proof to bring a charge against the woman. Therefore they had to let 
the woman go. Of course the 10.000 kroners-question is if it was right or wrong by 
Bergens Tidende to name the woman and publish the pictures - and if it acceptable to 
take pictures by a hidden camera. 
 
Lets analyse the case very briefly: 
 
First it is necessary to cheque what the Code of Ethics says about using name and 
pictures in court and crime reporting. Paragraph 4.7 states: «Be cautious in the use of 
names and pictures and other items of definite identification in court and crime 
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reporting. Particular consideration should be shown when writing about cases still being 
investigated, and cases involving young offenders. Refrain from identification unless this 
is necessary to meet just and fair demands for information.» 
The paragraph states that we have to be cautious, but the paragraph doesn’t state that the 
basic principle is to avoid using name in court and crime reporting.  
 
Second we must consider why and when we shall be cautious. In accordance with the 
paragraph «consideration should be shown (particular) when writing about cases still 
being investigated, and cases involving young offenders».  
 
Our case is not involving young offenders, but we have to be cautious because the case is 
still being investigated. So far it seems that the right ethical decision is to avoid 
identification. 
 
Third we must consider if identification «is necessary to meet just and fair demands for 
information».  In connection with that, we must answer three questions  
- is the case so seriously that the name need to be disclosed? 
- must we identify the woman for avoiding throwing unjustified suspicion on the 
woman’s colleagues? 
- do our responsibility for the woman demand an identification? 
 
 
 
II. The policy of considerations 
 
The degree of seriousness 
All crimes are negative for society. Actions that deviate from social norm, must be 
discussed and explained. The more serious the case is, the more attention is needed. 
Knowledge of crime is important information to the public. Therefore, it may be 
necessary to tell who has committed criminal acts, although often it’s enough to keeps 
telling which type of people who commit crimes. 
 
The issue affects many people 
Criminal acts involving many people, are of  big news interest. The need for information 
grows with volume and seriousness. Uncertainty crimes creates insecurity. 
 
Need to know who may commit crimes 
It is of public interest to know who is committing crime. The person's identity can be 
important to explain and understand the action, especially if there is a connection 
between the person's status and the crime. 
 
A legal security guarantee 
Transparency in the administration of justice strengthens confidence in the police, 
prosecutors and the courts. Identification can also prevent speculation abouy innocent 
people.. Openness about who is suspected, accused or charged with a crime, can provide 
new information that may be relevant to the case. 
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Suspicion against innocent 
Incomplete identification can cast suspicion on innocent people. 
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